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Abstract 
Title: Influence of CEO characteristics on short-term M&A performance – An event study on 
a sample of FTSE 100 companies 
Submission date: May 26th 2014 
Course: BUSN 89, Degree Project in Corporate and Financial Management - Master level, 15 
University Credit Points (UCP) or ECTS-credits 
Authors: Susanne Kilian, Annika Schindler 
Supervisor: Susanne Arvidsson 
Keywords: M&A performance, CEO characteristics, theory of agency costs, theory of hubris 
and overconfidence, corporate governance 
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to determine specific CEO characteristics that influence 
short-term M&A performance. Based on these findings, the board of directors might be able 
to improve the accomplishment of its responsibilities. 
Theoretical framework: The theoretical background covers the different views of value 
creation of M&As, the CEO’s influence on corporate decision-making, the theory of agency 
costs, the theory of hubris and overconfidence and corporate governance based on previous 
literature and empirical findings.  
Methodology: An event study approach is applied and OLS multivariate regressions are run. 
Short-term M&A performance is measured by the cumulative abnormal returns over a three-
day-window around the acquisition announcement.  
Empirical framework: The data sample consists of 164 M&As exercised by FTSE 100 
companies between January 1st 2004 and December 31st 2013. 
Conclusions: This research study confirms that CEO characteristics have a direct influence 
on short-term M&A performance. The cumulative abnormal returns of the 164 observed 
M&As indicate that on average the M&As fail to create substantial value for shareholders of 
the acquiring company. As the UK has one of the best corporate governance systems, the non-
value creation of acquisitions might be explained by the overconfident behaviour of CEOs. 
Thus, the board of directors is recommended to adapt its abilities to counteract this 
overconfidence. 
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1. Introduction 
On 18th of August 2011, Hewlett-Packard (H.P.) signed a USD 11.1 billion contract to acquire 
Autonomy with the purpose to transform itself into an innovative software company 
generating high margins. At the acquisition’s announcement day, Wall Street analysts 
described the deal as value destroying due to the fact that H.P., in their point of view, 
overpriced Autonomy’s intrinsic value. And even though H.P.’s shareholders showed their 
disapproval regarding the acquisition already in advance, H.P.’s management still settled the 
deal (Stewart, 2012). As a consequence, H.P.’s share value has dropped by 60% in the years 
following the announcement and H.P.’s shareholders filed lawsuits against the company and 
its auditors (BBC, 2012). The example of H.P. illustrates how a company’s management is 
able to pursue its own decisions disregarding shareholders’ interest in important corporate 
decisions like Merger & Acquisitions (M&As). 
In general, M&As represent an enormous business activity around the world. In 2013, 71,811 
M&A deals took place with a total deal value of USD 3.45 trillion (Bureau van Dijk, 2014). 
Due to this large amount, M&A activities often play an important role in the performance of a 
company. In general, M&As are undertaken to achieve strategic development for the buyer 
and the target firm with the overall objective to create shareholder value (Caselli, Gatti and 
Visconti, 2006). Acquisition activities present the most popular method to achieve corporate 
growth and are supposed to create value for shareholders through the realisation of synergies 
(Gaughan, 2011; Sirower and O’Byrne, 1998). 
Despite the large number of M&A deals, M&As are unique corporate investment decisions, 
demonstrated in several characteristics. First, the effect of M&As on shareholder wealth is 
directly assessed by markets after the announcement unlike, for instance, capital investments 
in property, plant and equipment (Sirower and O’Byrne, 1998). Second, acquisitions of public 
companies constitute an investment decision shareholders could easily make on their own by 
buying the target firm’s shares. Third, an acquisition requires the payment of all costs up-
front. Therefore, in order to create the expected value for the acquiring firm’s shareholders, 
the combined performance gains must exceed the sum of the expected performance gains of 
the two stand-alone companies and the premium paid (Gaughan, 2011; Sirower and O’Byrne, 
1998). However, the empirical evidence is conclusive that on average mergers1 fail to achieve 
                                                
1 The terms ‘M&A’, ‘mergers’ and ‘acquisitions’ are used interchangeably in this study. 
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the goal of substantial value creation for acquirers’ shareholders (Fung, Jo and Tsai, 2009; 
Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; Roll, 1986; Shefrin, 2005; Yim, 2013). 
Due to the fact that takeovers can be seen as individual decisions, the psychological aspect of 
individual decision-making must not be neglected when looking for reasons for the non-
value-creation of M&As (Roll, 1986). In other words, acquisition activities of companies are 
highly influenced by the actions and the perceptions of the firms’ Chief Executive Officers 
(CEOs) (Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2013; Shefrin, 2005). Consequently, one can conclude 
that managerial motives rather than shareholder value maximisation motives might be 
inherent in acquisition activities (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
The study is based on the theoretical foundation of the theory of agency costs (Fung, Jo and 
Tsai, 2009; Gaughan 2011; Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Odgen, Jen and 
O’Conner, 2002) and the behavioural finance theory of hubris and overconfidence (Doukas 
and Petmezas, 2007; Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Roll, 1986; Shefrin, 2005). These 
two main theoretical concepts represent the central foundations in explaining CEO’s 
behaviour in corporate decision-making and its consequences for the firm. The theory of 
agency costs can thereby be based on the contractual view of firms where managers are hired 
as agents to act in the interest of shareholders, the principals. Due to imperfectly aligned 
contracts between agents and principals, managers are likely to pursue their own goals at the 
expense of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In contrast 
to agency theory, overconfidence implies that managers do not act consciously against 
shareholders’ interests but that they destroy shareholder wealth by overestimating their ability 
to value target companies correctly (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Shefrin, 2005). As a 
consequence, overconfident CEOs overpay for targets, known as hubris (Roll, 1986). 
The Autonomy acquisition of H.P. illustrates how managers might be able to pursue their own 
decisions without taking the interest of their shareholders into account, resulting in a negative 
post-acquisition performance. As a contribution to the discussion of this corporate dilemma, 
the presented study determines specific characteristics that crucially impact M&A 
performance. Therefore, it can be valuable for the board of directors as well as for investors. 
First of all, the board of directors is able to adapt and improve its monitoring abilities by 
knowing which CEO characteristics affect M&A performance. Secondly, investors can assess 
how well the board represents their interests by preventing CEOs from undertaking value-
destroying acquisitions.  
3 
 
Many previous researchers focus on individual CEO characteristics and their influence on 
M&A activities and M&A performance (Aktas, de Bodt and Roll, 2006; Ferris, Jayaraman 
and Sabherwal, 2013; Levi, Li and Zhang, 2010; Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Yim, 
2013). However, the existing studies lack the following factors. First, previous studies mainly 
apply CEO characteristics as control variables or focus only on one characteristic (Lucey, 
Plaksina and Dowling, 2013; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Yim, 2013). Therefore, the 
presented study analyses the combined impact of several CEO characteristics on short-term 
M&A performance. Second, most of the former studies focus on influences of CEO 
characteristics on M&A decisions in the United States (US) (Aktas, de Bodt and Roll, 2006; 
Fung, Jo and Tsai, 2009; Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008). Thereby, these studies neglect 
the European market as the second largest takeover market in the world (Wilmer Cutler 
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, 2013). Hence, this study aims to investigate the European 
takeover market focusing on the United Kingdom (UK). Third, the global financial crisis of 
2007/ 2008 is not considered in most previous research studies. The research scope is limited 
to a time frame before the crisis and does not account for the possible impact the crisis might 
have on the extent the CEO characteristics affect M&A performance (Conn et al., 2004; 
Ferris, Jayaraman, Sabherwal, 2013; Yim, 2013). 
As a result, the objective of this research is to analyse the impact of certain CEO traits on 
short-term M&A performance as well as drawing implications for corporate governance in a 
European context, including the pre-and post-crisis time period. The study begins with a 
discussion of the most relevant theoretical foundations with respect to M&As, CEO 
characteristics and corporate governance, resulting in the definition of several hypotheses. 
The third part explains the applied event study methodology and multivariate regressions in 
order to test the defined hypotheses. Part four describes the empirical results gained from 
multivariate regressions. Based on these results, the impact and the significance of the 
different investigated CEO characteristics on short-term M&A performance is discussed. 
Finally, the conclusion presents implications of the results in a corporate governance context. 
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2. Theoretical and Empirical Background and Hypotheses Definition 
In this chapter, the theoretical background for this study is presented and previous empirical 
findings are discussed. Based on the literature review, we define seven hypotheses that are 
investigated throughout this research study. 
2.1. Theoretical Framework 
In order to gain an overall perspective of the theoretical background of this research study and 
its linkages, the authors developed a conceptual framework as shown in figure 1. 
 
 
 
Due to the fact that individual managers often play a significant role in corporate decision-
making processes (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003), CEOs are likely to crucially influence M&A 
activities and specifically, short-term M&A performance. First, we discuss different views on 
the value-creation of M&A activities. Afterwards, previous empirical research about the 
influence of CEO characteristics, on corporate decisions and performance, is reviewed in 
order to specify the CEO traits that might determine M&A performance. Third, the theory of 
agency costs and the behavioural finance theory of hubris and overconfidence are introduced 
as foundations in order to explain the impact of CEO characteristics. Finally, we emphasise 
that corporate governance systems determine to what extent the CEO characteristics affect 
Theory	  of	  
Agency	  Costs	   Theory of  Hubris & Overconfidence 
CEO 
Characteristics 
M&A Performance 
Corporate 
Governance    
Figure 1: Conceptual framework (based on Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Jensen, 
1986; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Roll, 1986; Tricker, 2012) 
 
5 
 
M&A performance, as illustrated in figure 1. Thereby, the importance of corporate 
governance for a company’s performance is discussed by reviewing relevant corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
 
2.2. Value Creation of M&As 
M&As can be seen as a market control mechanism because companies where resources are 
not used in the most efficient way are likely to be acquired. This guarantees that major 
departures from maximisation of shareholder wealth are only temporarily and will be solved 
by the market and management teams competing for the rights to manage the company’s 
resources (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2007). Therefore, managerial 
actions, which are taken to decrease the probability of takeovers, such as adoption of 
antitakeover charter amendment, standstill agreements and targeted block repurchases, lead to 
negative abnormal stock returns (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Jensen and Ruback, 
1983; Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2007; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
The sources to create takeover gains and to maximise shareholder value are various. First, 
acquisitions present a popular method to increase a firm’s growth, especially in a mature 
industry (Sirower and O’Byrne, 1998). Besides, the acquirer believes in potential operational 
synergies with the target company that can be realised by a merger such as revenue 
enhancements, cost reduction, market power and know-how. Additionally, the purpose of a 
takeover can be to achieve financial synergies like coinsurance because the cash flows of the 
two merging companies are not perfectly correlated. Further financial synergies result, among 
others, from lower cost of capital and from higher tax shields (Gaughan, 2011; Schweiger and 
Very, 2003). The effect of coinsurance as a financial synergy is highest in diversifying 
mergers where the company acquires a target, which operates outside the company’s industry. 
In contrast, operational synergies are mainly aimed for horizontal and vertical integrations 
(Schweiger and Very, 2003). The former refers to the acquisition of a rival whereas the latter 
implies a merger of companies with a buyer-seller relationship (Gaughan, 2011). 
Whereas the consensus between researchers about the evidence of value creation for target 
firm’s shareholders is strong (Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; Jensen and Ruback, 1983), there 
has been an on-going discussion about the value creation for shareholders of acquiring firms 
over the last decades. Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) state that acquiring companies have 
significant abnormal returns for their first four merger announcements. Jensen and Ruback 
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(1983) conclude, after a detailed review of several empirical studies about the wealth effect of 
takeover activities, that bidding firms do not destroy shareholder value. 
In contrast, Roll (1986) underlines that overall takeover gains for bidding companies have 
been overstated and that their existence is highly questionable. For instance, evidence is found 
that shareholders of acquiring companies experience a wealth loss of 10% over the five-year 
post-merger period (Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker, 1992). Moreover, cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) around the announcement of an acquisition decline from deal to deal, 
implying that the market perceives high acquisitiveness negatively (Aktas, de Bodt and Roll, 
2006). Malmendier and Tate (2008) confirm this negative reaction and further emphasise that 
the average deal quality is lowered by high acquisition frequency. Thus, high acquisitiveness 
leads to lower announcement returns. Eckbo (2009), Roll (1986) as well as Sirower and 
O’Byrne (1998) underline that the payment of an acquisition premium sharply decreases the 
probability of creating shareholder wealth. The takeover premium is often related to the 
target’s status (private or public). As private firms cannot be sold as easily on the market as 
shares, they are subject to the liquidity discount. Hence, the likelihood of paying high 
premiums decreases. Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) find evidence that bidder 
shareholders lose when their company buys public firms but they gain when the company 
buys a private firm or a subsidiary.  
All in all, one can conclude that, on average, acquisitions do not create substantial value for 
acquirer’s shareholders. Thus, additional factors, besides the inefficient use of companies’ 
resources, have to be identified in order to explain the enormous execution of M&A deals 
around the world. 
 
2.3. CEO Influence on Corporate Decision-Making 
The choice and execution of different financing, investment and organisational strategies are 
highly dependent on the CEO of a firm. Particularly, those managerial impacts are significant 
in acquisition or diversification decisions as well as dividend policy, interest coverage and 
cost-cutting policies. As CEOs vary in their behaviour in regards to corporate decision-
making across firms, the performance results differ as well (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). 
Decisions made by managers are likely to have a large impact on the company’s performance 
and profitability depending on their degree of influence on corporate decision-making. The 
more power a CEO has in this process, the less objective is his/ her judgement scope 
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regarding corporate decision-making. Nevertheless, centralised CEO decision-making across 
firms can lead either to superior performance or to weak performance. Less powerful CEOs, 
meaning that several top managers are involved in the decision-making process, cause more 
balanced and less extreme performance because the CEOs have to make compromises with 
other executives (Adams, Almeida and Ferreira, 2005). The influence of CEOs on a firm’s 
performance and profitability is strengthened by previous research (Child, 1972; Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984; both cited in Adams, Almeida and Ferreira, 2005:1404). 
Furthermore, several empirical studies investigate the influence of personality-level variables 
on corporate performance. A CEO’s management talent and his/ her execution skills are 
positively related to firm performance (Kaplan, Klebanov and Sorensen, 2012). Besides, 
outside CEOs with previous CEO experience do not perform better on average than outside 
CEOs without previous experiences, although the market reacts more positively to the hiring 
of an outside ex-CEO (Elsaid, Wang and Davidson III, 2011). Focusing on the impact of CEO 
characteristics on its acquisitiveness, previous studies conclude that younger CEOs are more 
likely to frequently undertake acquisition activities due to stronger compensation incentives 
(Yim, 2013) and, with regards to male CEOs, due to their high testosterone level (Levi, Li and 
Zhang, 2010). Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013) investigate that a CEO’s risk tolerance and 
optimism is positively related to his/ her acquisitiveness. Supporting these findings, Serfling 
(2014) underlines that older CEOs are more risk-averse and focus more on diversifying 
acquisitions than younger CEOs. In addition, Lucey, Plaksina and Dowling (2013) state that 
CEOs with a high ascribed and achieved social status are less likely to undertake acquisitions 
because CEOs become more risk-averse to protect their prestigious status.  
As outlined above, CEOs have a large impact on important corporate decisions, especially in 
M&A decision-making processes (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). As a result, a conflict of 
interest between CEOs and shareholders can arise if CEOs are not running the firms in a way 
to maximise shareholder value. It can be explained by the theory of agency costs and the 
behavioural finance theory of hubris and overconfidence (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Roll, 
1986). 
 
 2.4. Theory of Agency Costs  
The agency cost theory emphasises the contractual view of the company defined as the 
relationship between the owners (principals) and the managers (agents) of the company. The 
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interest and rights of shareholders are represented by the board of directors that appoints 
managers to run the firm in a way that maximises shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Therefore, managers are required to execute corporate actions and decisions as agents 
of their shareholders, emphasising the separation of ownership and control. As shareholders 
provide the financing, they are owners of the company whereas managers possess control 
rights due to imperfectly aligned contracts and uninformed shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Managers often make decisions to benefit themselves at the expense of their 
shareholders. The costs associated with these actions are the monitoring and bonding costs of 
the agents by the board of directors as well as the residual loss resulting from CEO activities 
that are not in line with shareholder wealth maximisation (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Those agency costs related to acquisitions are further increased by specific 
firm characteristics such as the implementation of weak pay-for-performance arrangements 
(Yim, 2013), the availability of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) and the existence of a weak and 
dependent board of directors (Adams, Almeida and Ferreira, 2005; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). The latter is further discussed in the corporate governance section 2.6.. 
Considering the compensation factor, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the contractual 
structure of a company reduces the agent’s risk-taking as they either receive a fixed payoff or 
an incentive payoff dependent on pre-defined performance goals. However, managers aim to 
decrease the riskiness of their income by executing, for instance a strategy of 
underemployment of debt, management entrenchment as well as excessive diversifying 
acquisitions. In addition, they increase their compensations by focusing on short-term value 
creation, by manipulating accounting earnings or by maximising firm size (Odgen, Jen and 
O’Conner, 2002). As CEO compensation is often related to the size of the firm and as 
acquisitions are generally awarded, regardless of their performance, the incentives for 
managers are high to pursue M&As even when they know that these acquisitions are most 
likely to destroy shareholder value (Yim, 2013). Moreover, the larger the size of a company, 
the better might be the reputation of its CEO. This problem of overinvestment is often called 
empire-building and is related to the agency cost theory of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986a, 
1986b, 1988; cited in Mann and Sicherman, 1991:214). 
This theory developed by Jensen (1986) refers to discretionary cash flow, which is available 
to CEOs in excess of what is required to finance all positive net present value investment 
projects. If the interests of CEOs and shareholders are perfectly matched, the excess available 
cash would be distributed to shareholders and hence, create maximum shareholder wealth. 
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Instead of distributing the additional cash to their shareholders, self-interested managers use 
the free cash flow for their own benefits (Jensen, 1986a, 1986b, 1988; cited in Mann and 
Sicherman, 1991:214).  
In order to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow, Jensen (1986) suggests to increase the 
debt level of firms to constrain managers and to enhance monitoring by creditors. 
Additionally, Mann and Sicherman (1991) propose that shareholders should increasingly have 
the ability to oversee free cash flow directly. If shareholders are able to do so, agency costs 
will be reflected in lower share price, leading to a lower firm value. Besides, the board of 
directors should fulfil their responsibility to monitor the managers efficiently in order to settle 
the principal-agent problem. As the reputation of managers is established by, for example, the 
value maximising use of free cash flow in past acquisition activities, shareholders base their 
reaction to new acquisitions on CEO’s previous value-creating decisions (John and Nachman, 
1985; cited in Mann and Sicherman, 1991:214).  
Nevertheless, problems associated with the principal-agent relation remain, as investors might 
not have access to all significant information related to important investment opportunities to 
identify and evaluate the aims pursued by CEOs. Even if all information was observable for 
them, investors would not have the guarantee that CEOs decide for projects with a positive 
net present value (Mann and Sicherman, 1991). Other criticism related to the agency theory is 
the narrow theoretical perspective as it focuses on the contractual relationship between 
shareholders and agents in order to explain the importance of corporate governance. Thus, it 
considers quantitative measures such as compensation aspects instead of taking interpersonal 
and group behavioural aspects of the board of directors into account. In addition, the theory 
assumes that all people are acting in self-interest without considering the interests of others. 
Hence, directors who are supposed to act in the interests of shareholders cannot always be 
assumed to fulfil their responsibilities (Tricker, 2012). 
 
2.5. Theory of Hubris and Overconfidence  
Besides the theory of agency costs, the behavioural aspects of hubris and overconfidence 
represent a theoretical foundation to explain CEO’s behaviour in M&A decision-making.  
The takeover market is often compared to an auction market where different management 
teams compete for the right to rule over the resources of a company (Jensen and Ruback, 
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1983). Since the highest bidder is most likely to win the auction, overconfident managers are 
willing to pay excessive premiums because they overestimate the value of the target company 
and potential synergy realisations. Overconfident managers “view themselves as better than 
average” in terms of their abilities and about their level of knowledge (Shefrin, 2005:6). As a 
result, mistakes occur more frequently than they expect (Shefrin, 2005).  
Roll (1986) was the first to introduce the hubris theory that relates the phenomena of 
extensive takeover premiums to managers’ overconfidence. The hubris theory implies that 
CEOs of acquiring firms pay premiums for targets above the current market price by making 
their own valuation superior to the market valuation (Roll, 1986). In contrast to the theory of 
agency costs, the CEO does not necessarily act on purpose against shareholder interests. 
Hubris can also be caused when the CEO believes to act in the interest of shareholders but 
overestimates his/ her abilities to value the target correctly as well as the potential synergies 
of the acquisition. In addition, he/ she underestimates the risk associated with the acquisition 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Shefrin, 2005). As a consequence, overconfident managers are 
more likely to pursue and complete acquisitions as well as engage in diversifying mergers 
compared to rational CEOs (Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; Shefrin, 2005). The empirical 
evidence suggests that overconfident CEOs materialise lower announcement returns and poor 
long-term performances compared to acquisitions undertaken by rational CEOs (Doukas and 
Petmezas, 2007; Kolasinski and Li, 2013). According to Malmendier and Tate (2008), the 
average short-term effect of acquisitions, announced by overconfident CEOs, on stock returns 
is -90 basis points compared to a negative return of -12 basis points for acquisitions 
announced by non-overconfident CEOs. 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) underline three factors that can cause overconfidence: first, the 
illusion of control about the outcome of the action; second, a high degree of commitment to 
good outcomes due to a relation between good performance and personal wealth; and at last, 
an abstract reference point that complicates a rational assessment and comparison. The last 
factor is captured by Doukas and Petmezas (2007) who emphasise that overconfidence in 
acquisitions is even stronger for targets with limited disclosed information like private 
companies because managers are more prone to rely on their own assessment and beliefs. 
Besides, overconfidence is often accompanied by excessive optimism. Managers overestimate 
the possibility of experiencing favourable outcomes and underestimate the likelihood of 
facing unfavourable outcomes (Shefrin, 2005). Moreover, a CEO’s overconfidence might 
increase during his life due to the self-attribution bias. The bias describes the tendency of 
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CEOs to take the credit for successful acquisitions but to insist taking responsibility for 
failures, enhancing the confidence about their abilities over time (Doukas and Petmezas, 
2007; Shefrin, 2005). The bias also corresponds to the ‘better-than-average’ effect, which 
describes that individuals believe they have superior abilities (Shefrin, 2005), and the ‘narrow 
confidence interval’ that implies that CEOs set the probability distribution for uncertain 
events like mergers too tight (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips, 1982; cited in Doukas and 
Petmezas, 2007:537). 
An important aspect of overconfidence implies that CEOs only overinvest if they have 
sufficient internal funds available. Due to the fact that they overvalue not only the target firm 
but also their own firm, overconfident CEOs are likely to perceive their firm as undervalued 
in the market. Therefore, they are reluctant to issue debt or equity securities and to pay the 
target with stock. Consequently, overconfident CEOs prefer all-cash payments (Doukas and 
Petmezas, 2007; Shefrin, 2005). The perception of the firm being undervalued in the market 
can also lead to the problem that overconfident CEOs forego positive net present value 
acquisitions because they perceive the financing as too costly (Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 
2008). Nevertheless, overconfidence is sometimes assumed to create shareholder value since 
CEOs are, for instance, more willing to take debt and make use of tax shield advantages due 
to lower risk aversion (Shefrin, 2005). Furthermore, Kaplan, Klebanov and Sorensen (2012) 
emphasise that better overall performance of companies is positively related to a CEO’s 
resoluteness and overconfidence. 
Ferris, Jayaraman and Sabherwal (2013) confirm the US-based findings of Malmendier and 
Tate (2005, 2008) for a global sample of companies by concluding that overconfidence is an 
international phenomenon. It can be extensively attributed to CEOs of firms headquartered in 
Christian countries. Barber and Odean (2001) investigate the influence of gender on 
overconfidence and conclude that men are more overconfident than women in a finance 
setting. 
In previous research studies, different measures of CEO overconfidence have been developed. 
Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) identify CEOs as overconfident based on press coverage 
and extensive holdings of stock options.2 In addition, CEOs are classified as overconfident 
when they pursue five or more acquisition within three years (Doukas and Petmezas, 2007). 
Kolasinski and Li (2013) define managers as overconfident when they purchase their own 
                                                
2 CEOs who extensively hold their options until expiration are called ‘longholders’. 
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firm’s shares and earn a negative abnormal return over the next 180 days. Their study 
discovers that overconfident CEOs become less overconfident when they experience a 
personal loss on their stock trading. 
Roll (1986) as well as Doukas and Petmezas (2007) argue against a learning effect from 
M&A experience due to the low frequency of M&As, compared to other investment 
decisions, and the self-attribution bias. In contrast, Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2006) prove 
learning effects from prior acquisitions that have different consequences for the acquisitions 
undertaken by rational CEOs compared to the ones undertaken by hubris-infected3 CEOs. 
They conclude that rational CEOs develop a more aggressive bidding behaviour as a result of 
their experience from previous M&A activities. Hence, there is a declining trend in CARs 
from deal to deal. Additionally, the duration, defined as the time frame between successive 
deals, decreases as managers increasingly win auction processes due to their aggressive 
behaviour. In comparison, M&A deals undertaken by hubris-infected CEOs reveal a positive 
trend of CARs and in duration. As investors respond negatively to previous excessive M&A 
activities by overconfident CEOs, managers are required to become more cautious. 
Nonetheless, hubris-infected CEOs have on average a higher acquisition frequency and they 
learn at a slower pace than rational CEOs (Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll, 2006).  
Due to the fact that overconfident managers suboptimally invest even when their interests are 
perfectly aligned to shareholders’ interests and no information asymmetries exist, an active 
board of directors is required to monitor the M&A activities of CEOs and eventually constrain 
their use of internally generated funds (Malmendier and Tate, 2005). Furthermore, Kolasinski 
and Li (2013) underline that a strong and independent board of directors reduces the amount 
of mergers undertaken by overconfident CEOs. The importance of corporate governance 
mechanisms is further discussed in the next section, beginning with a presentation of the UK 
corporate governance system. 
 
2.6. Corporate Governance 
2.6.1. Corporate Governance in the UK 
In 1992, the UK introduced the world’s first corporate governance report, the Cadbury 
Report, and until now, it has released the most reports compared to any other country 
                                                
3 Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2006) use the term ‘hubris-infected’ as a proxy for overconfidence. 
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(Tricker, 2012). Moreover, the UK is considered to have one of the best corporate governance 
systems globally (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
The corporate governance model of the UK and Commonwealth is based on common law and 
it follows a ‘comply or explain’ approach to corporate governance (La Porta et al., 1998; 
Tricker, 2012). Companies can either state that they adhere to the codes of corporate 
governance principles and good practice or they have to explain why they do not. Therefore, 
the UK/ Commonwealth model is often defined as principles-based model. In contrast, the 
American model incorporates the codes of corporate governance in their law. Nevertheless, as 
companies in the UK mainly apply international accounting standards, the compliance with 
corporate governance principles is enhanced. The codes emphasise a high degree of 
transparency and accountability towards shareholders and the public (Tricker, 2012). This 
signifies that the interest of managers and shareholders are better aligned and that the board of 
directors follows more efficient monitoring practices (Rani, Yadav and Jain, 2013). 
The codes of corporate governance further imply, in particular for listed companies, to have 
non-executive directors on the board and to divide board responsibilities throughout board 
committees. In contrast to the common presence of CEO duality in the US, the roles of the 
chairman and the CEO are separated in the UK. Compared to European civil law countries 
such as France or the Netherlands, the ownership of UK companies is highly dispersed among 
individuals and institutional investors. Hence, M&As are more likely to be undertaken, as 
bidders do not have to deal with a dominant shareholder such as the government or a financial 
institution, indicating a strong market for corporate control (Tricker, 2012). Nevertheless, 
according to La Porta et al. (1998), the strongest protection of shareholder rights is guaranteed 
in common law countries and in companies with a low ownership concentration. 
2.6.2. Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
The outlined theories of agency costs as well as hubris and overconfidence indicate that CEO 
characteristics can essentially influence corporate decision-making, in particular in M&A 
deals. All corporate decisions are subject to corporate governance reflecting whether 
shareholder value maximisation as the primary goal is guaranteed while CEOs are pursuing 
M&As. Therefore, the board of directors plays an important role because it selects the 
manager to run the company’s operations and it monitors the CEO’s actions and performance. 
Additionally, it advises and assists in important strategic decisions (Adams, Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2010). Consequently, the board also carries the responsibility for the execution of 
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M&A deals. It has to ensure that it fulfils on the one hand its performance role, strategy 
formulation and policymaking, and on the other hand its conformance role of executive 
supervision and accountability towards the firm’s shareholders and the public (Tricker, 2012). 
Hence, the corporate board is an important corporate governance mechanism combining 
expertise, independence and legal power (Byrd and Hickman, 1992).  
All directors have to represent the common duty of trust and care, regardless of their 
classification as executive or non-executive directors.4 The director’s duty of trust is about to 
act with integrity and honesty to represent all shareholder interests and the latter implies to 
exercise an independent, objective judgement in corporate decision-making. Executive 
directors hold an executive management position within the company whereas non-executive 
directors are not part of the executive management. Non-executive directors can be further 
distinguished by being independent according to the corporate governance code or of being to 
some extent connected or affiliated to the company (Tricker, 2012). Affiliated non-executive 
directors are for instance a former CEO of the company, a director in the supplying firm or a 
family member of the CEO or chairman (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Tricker, 2012). 
Even though inside directors within the corporate board mainly have viable knowledge about 
the company itself and its activities, the presence of outside directors in the board of directors 
demonstrate independence, expertise and objectivity (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). As a result, 
the monitoring of managers by outside directors accounts for a very important function of the 
board (Winter, 1977; cited in Byrd and Hickman, 1992:196). Focusing on the M&A process, 
outside directors evaluate in particular the management’s acquisition proposal (Koontz, 1976; 
Weiss, 1991; both cited in Byrd and Hickman, 1992:196) and monitor the whole acquisition 
process. They ensure that managers take actions without harming the firm’s shareholders by 
following its own empire-building goals (Bacon, 1985; cited in Byrd and Hickman, 1992:197; 
Byrd and Hickman, 1992). In addition, they can assess the benefits and costs of an acquisition 
more objectively and in some cases, they have a better knowledge of the target firm and the 
industry it is operating in. As a result, the average abnormal announcement-day return follows 
a less negative trend for companies with a board consisting of more than 50% of outside 
directors (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). Moreover, an independent board is also more likely to 
replace CEOs that are pursuing value-destroying M&As at the expense of their shareholders 
(Kolasinski and Li, 2013; Lehn and Zhao, 2006). Nevertheless, shareholder interests are not 
                                                
4 The terms ‘non-executive directors’ and ‘outside directors’ as well as the terms ‘executive directors’ and 
‘inside directors’ are used interchangeably in this study.  
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represented and protected effectively enough if the board includes only outside directors as 
inside directors contribute viable firm-specific knowledge (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). 
Besides the importance of an efficient board of directors, other corporate governance 
mechanisms can impact the CEO’s role in M&A deals and ensure a value-creating M&A 
performance. Acquiring firms that separate the role of the CEO and chairman experience 
higher abnormal announcement returns as this corporate governance mechanism, the 
elimination of ‘CEO duality’, emphasises the independence and objectivity of the board in its 
duty to monitor the CEO (Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2007; Tricker, 2012). According to Rani, 
Yadav and Jain (2013), a weak corporate governance system indicates a low degree of 
operational and financial transparency leading to a high level of information asymmetry 
between shareholders and managers. In contrast, companies with a more effective corporate 
governance system are associated with better monitoring procedures and thus lower agency 
costs. Rani, Yadav and Jain (2013) conclude that acquiring firms having such a governance 
system experience higher stock returns around the acquisition announcement. 
 
2.7. Hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical background and empirical findings outlined above, we define seven 
hypotheses to investigate which CEO characteristics have a crucial influence on short-term 
M&A performance. Thereby, each hypothesis represents a certain CEO characteristic. 
 
Previous studies have confirmed that corporate decision-making such as M&As can be 
affected by the age of a CEO indicating on the one side experience and on the other side 
improved perception (Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2013). Previous studies have used age as an 
indicator to measure personal risk-aversion, which increases the older the CEO gets (Shefrin, 
2005; cited in Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2013:107). Due to the fact, that older CEOs become 
more cautious, overconfidence decreases with age. Consequently, the CEO pursues fewer 
acquisition activities (Ferris, Jayaraman and Sabherwal, 2013; Yim, 2013). Hence, our first 
hypothesis states following: 
H1: The acquisition undertaken by a young CEO has a weaker short-term M&A 
performance than the acquisition undertaken by an older CEO. 
 
16 
 
According to Fung, Jo and Tsai (2009), a long CEO tenure is regarded as an indicator for 
experience and so CEOs with a shorter tenure tend to engage more in value-destroying M&A 
activities due to a lack of sufficient experience. Additionally, CEO tenure can be perceived as 
an indicator for knowledge development (Adams, Almeida and Ferreira, 2005). As inside 
directors possess valuable knowledge and expertise about the company (Byrd and Hickman, 
1992; Tricker, 2012), it can be assumed that the longer the CEO is within the board, as 
executive director, he/ she is able to exercise well-founded decisions. Therefore, we assume in 
our second hypothesis: 
H2: The acquisition undertaken by a long-tenured CEO has a stronger short-term 
M&A performance than the acquisition undertaken by a short-tenured CEO. 
Whereas the second hypothesis focuses on the manager’s tenure as CEO in the current 
company, the following hypothesis considers the entire time period the manager has worked 
for this company, taking into account the possible time before he/ she was appointed as CEO. 
In accordance with the argumentation of the second hypothesis, the overall firm tenure of the 
CEO is also regarded as a factor of experience, commitment and knowledge enhancement 
resulting in the third hypothesis: 
H3: The acquisition undertaken by a long-firm-tenured CEO has a stronger short-term 
M&A performance than the acquisition undertaken by a short-firm-tenured CEO. 
CEOs of acquiring companies holding non-executive directorships have to provide the board 
with an independent and objective point of view when it comes to corporate decision-making 
such as M&As (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). Directors are required to fulfil the independence 
criteria according to the codes of good practice in corporate governance. Additionally, outside 
directors have to fulfil conformance-orientated roles such as exercising independent 
judgement and monitoring of CEO’s actions in another company (Tricker, 2012). Hence, we 
conclude that he/ she applies this role as well in the own firm by incorporating a well-founded 
decision-making process. As a result, our fourth hypothesis indicates following: 
H4: The acquisition undertaken by a CEO holding a board position within another 
company has a stronger short-term M&A performance than the acquisition undertaken 
by a CEO without holding an outside directorship.  
Whereas hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3 regard experience and knowledge as performance 
enhancing, hypothesis 5 and hypotheses 6a and 6b are built on the theory of overconfidence.  
17 
 
Focusing on CEOs having CEO experience in previous companies, the self-attribution bias is 
considered to be one of the main causes of overconfidence. Thereby, CEOs are likely to take 
the credit for the success of companies where they have been CEO. Previous studies confirm 
that overconfident CEOs tend to pursue more M&As that result in lower abnormal returns 
compared the ones of rational CEOs (Doukas and Petmezas, 2007). Since CEOs with 
previous CEO experience are assumed to behave more overconfident in corporate decisions 
than the ones without any previous CEO experience, we state the following hypothesis: 
H5: The acquisition undertaken by a CEO having CEO experience in previous 
companies has a weaker short-term M&A performance than the acquisition undertaken 
by a CEO without previous CEO experience. 
Building on the overconfidence theory, CEOs having degrees in the field of business as well 
as science are likely to believe that they have superior knowledge and abilities compared to 
other managers, also known as ‘better-than-average’ effect (Shefrin, 2005). As mentioned 
above, M&As that are pursued by overconfident CEOs have lower abnormal stock returns 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2008). In addition, we follow Malmendier and Tate (2008) assuming 
that business education increases the acquisition activities of a CEO. Thus, it lowers the 
average deal quality and the announcement returns. This is reflected in the following 
hypotheses: 
H6a: The acquisition undertaken by a CEO having a business and technical education 
background has a weaker short-term M&A performance than the acquisition 
undertaken by a CEO who has education in only one study field.  
H6b: The acquisition undertaken by a CEO having a business education is assumed to 
have a weaker short-term M&A performance than the acquisition undertaken by a 
CEO with a technical background. 
Based on the research of Doukas and Petmezas (2007), CEOs are categorised as being 
overconfident if they execute five or more acquisitions within a three-year period, resulting in 
low returns for the company and its shareholders. By overestimating their own ability and 
know-how, they assume to act in their shareholders’ interest by executing several M&As 
within a short period of time (Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Roll, 1986). We aim to verify the 
negative effect of high acquisitiveness by testing the following hypothesis: 
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H7: The acquisition undertaken by a CEO representing at least his/ her third 
acquisition in the sample period has a weaker short-term M&A performance than the 
first or second acquisition undertaken by this CEO. 
The verification of the above hypotheses is tested through multivariate regressions in order to 
gain insights regarding the influence of CEO characteristics on short-term M&A performance. 
The empirical research approach is presented in detail in the following methodology chapter.  
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3. Methodology 
The third chapter outlines the research approach of this study. The process of data collection 
and sample development as well as the variables used for the multivariate regressions are 
defined. In addition, the regression models and employed robustness tests are explained. 
3.1. Research Objective 
The objective of this research study is to identify and analyse how different CEO 
characteristics can influence short-term M&A performance. In particular, personal aspects in 
regards to M&A decisions are examined within a European setting, covering the time period 
from 2004 until 2013. The defined hypotheses, based on previous empirical research studies, 
are tested by conducting multivariate regression analyses. As a result, we can conclude which 
CEO characteristics have a crucial influence on short-term M&A performance and what kind 
of implications can be drawn for corporate governance. 
 
3.2. Data Sample 
The UK plays a major role in the European M&A market. In 2013, the deals by value and the 
transactions by volume represented 24% and 22% in the European area respectively (CMS, 
2013). It has been the second biggest target by volume in 2013 after the US (Bureau van Dijk, 
2014). Overall, the UK is the most M&A active country in Europe, by value and by volume 
(CMS, 2013). Hence, the research scope for this study focuses on acquisition announcements 
of companies of the Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 share index (FTSE 100)5 in the UK 
within the ten-year time period from 2004 to 2013. The focus is set on FTSE 100 companies 
which act as a buyer in an M&A transaction.  
In order to derive the final sample, the following criteria for acquisitions and companies are 
used: 
1. The buying company is a (parent) company listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). M&A deals of subsidiaries are excluded since they are often executed by their 
own CEOs. As a substantial contribution by the parent companies’ CEOs is not 
involved, those deals are not representative for this study scope.  
                                                
5 The FTSE 100 index represents the share performance of the 100 most actively traded and largest firms on the 
London Stock Exchange (Financial Times, 2014). The constituents of the FTSE 100 index are taken from 
Reuters as of April 2014 (Reuters, 2014) in order to derive our data sample. 
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2. The company announced the acquisition between January 1st 2004 and December 31st 
2013. The deal is closed until December 31st 2013. 
3. The acquirer’s return data over a three-day window around the announcement date is 
available at Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
4. Following Malmendier and Tate (2008), the research data is limited to transactions 
whereby the acquiring firm gains a majority stake in the target firm, an equity stake of 
at least 51%, resulting in a change of control. It implies that the toehold of the 
company before the acquisition is less than 50%. 
5. Information about the transaction value must be disclosed to assure that the acquisition 
can be considered as significant for financial reporting purposes (Conn et al., 2004; 
Kolasinski and Li, 2013). 
6. Following Doukas and Petmezas (2007) and Masulis, Wang and Xi (2007), the deal 
size is required to present at least 1% of the acquirer’s market value, measured at the 
last fiscal year end prior to the acquisition’s announcement. The requirement is 
necessary to specify the deals where the CEO has substantial influence on the 
activity.6 
7. Financial institutions like banks, insurance companies, investment funds, venture 
capital firms and property development and investment firms are excluded from the 
sample. The financial institutions have been excluded in previous studies (for example 
Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; Fama and French, 1992; Fung, Jo and Tsai, 2009) due to 
their common high leverage ratio which does not imply the same meaning of financial 
distress as for nonfinancial firms. In addition, the high regulation standards of 
financial institutions limit the power of CEO to pursue acquisitions. Besides, 
investment funds, venture capital firms and property development and investment 
firms are excluded because acquisitions present a substantial part of their business 
activities (Lucey, Plaksina and Dowling, 2013). 
                                                
6 Thomson Reuters Eikon delivers the deal value for each M&A in USD. As all of the other financial data used 
in this research study is denoted in GBP, the USD deal value is converted at the GBP/ USD exchange rate of the 
announcement day in order to gain the GBP value of each M&A deal. The exchange rate is derived from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream respectively. 
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8. No distinction is made between domestic and cross-border acquisitions as well as 
between diversifying and non-diversifying M&A deals. 
As a result of the application of the above restrictions, we gain a sample of 164 valid M&A 
deals undertaken by 56 FTSE companies, which can be found in appendix A. The companies 
and the M&As that have been excluded because they do not fulfil the defined criteria are 
illustrated in appendix B and appendix C respectively. 
 
3.3. Time Period 
In order to analyse the influence of CEO characteristics on a significant amount of M&A 
announcements, a time period of ten years has been chosen starting on January 1st 2004 and 
ending on December 31st 2013. As the global financial crisis of 2007 impacted the number 
and value of M&As in the subsequent years, as shown in figure 2, a pre- and post crisis time 
frame is taken into account to avoid a distortion of results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even though the sixth merger wave started, according to the literature, in 2003 (Alexandridis, 
Mavrovitis and Travlos, 2012; Kummer and Steger, 2008), the M&A demand grew 
significantly in 2004. The increase was driven the demand of private equity firms that 
benefited from the low interest rate environment and the growing capital and real estate 
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markets (Gaughan, 2011). According to Kengelbach and Ross (2011), the M&A boom of this 
wave took place between 2004 and 2008. Moreover, the worldwide M&A activity, as 
illustrated in figure 2, started slowly to increase again by 2003 after the economic downturn 
of 2001 (Gaughan, 2011) whereas the number of deals and the total deal volume in Europe 
began to rise in 2004 (Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, 2013). As this research 
study focuses on M&A activities by companies listed on the LSE, the European M&A 
development is taken as benchmark to define the beginning of the considered time period as 
of 2004. 
 
3.4. Data Collection 
Based on Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009), data in research studies can be categorised as 
primary and secondary data as well as quantitative and qualitative data.  
Our research study covers secondary data such as books, journals, articles and organisation’s 
databases since the obtained data has been already observed and interpreted for other 
purposes. The use and further interpretation of secondary data increases the amount of data 
available for our research. In contrast, primary data implies that data is collected in particular 
for a specific research project by conducting interviews, questionnaires or observations, 
which is not subject to our study purpose. Additionally, our secondary data can be categorised 
as quantitative and qualitative data. The former represents numerical data obtained by data 
collection procedures whereas the latter is defined as non-numeric and non-standardised data. 
For this study, both methods are applied and equally important. We classify the qualitative 
data into different categories in order to conduct an empirical analysis of the defined 
hypotheses (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009).  
All required data, except the data about the CEO characteristics, is obtained by the databases 
provided by LINC finance lab at the Lund University, School of Economics and 
Management. To minimise the potential error resulting from using three different databases 
for the sample, we consistently use one database within the different group of variables: 
• Thomson Reuters Eikon is used to obtain our M&A deal sample within the ten-year 
time period of 2004 until 2013 according to the defined requirements outlined above. 
The deal-specific control variables are derived from the M&A sample.  
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• S&P Capital IQ provides the data for gaining the firm-specific control variables for 
each company in the sample due to the fact that the necessary information was not 
completely available at Thomson Reuters Eikon. All variables are measured at fiscal 
year end prior to the acquisition announcement. 
• Thomson Reuters Datastream is used in order to gain the acquirer’s return data over a 
three-day window around the acquisition announcement date and the market returns 
for the FTSE-All Share Index. 
Regarding the data collection for the considered CEO characteristics, the information is 
derived from financial market data platforms like Reuters or Bloomberg Businessweek and the 
annual reports of the firms. Our sample consists of 75 CEOs that are presented in appendix D. 
 
3.5. Event Study Methodology 
As this study aims to identify how CEO characteristics have an impact on M&A performance, 
the event study methodology approach is applied. By implying financial market data, event 
studies examine how a certain event such as an acquisition, the issuance of new debt or an 
earning announcement can influence a company’s value and thus, shareholder wealth. 
(Khotari and Warner, 2006; MacKinlay, 1997). The event study method is based on the 
theory of an efficient and rational market, developed by Fama (1970). Therefore, the event’s 
impact on the company is directly reflected in its stock returns (MacKinlay, 1997).  
3.5.1. Measurement of M&A Performance 
Different approaches to measure M&A performance by using the event study methodology 
can be considered. The short-term window event study method has been mostly conducted in 
previous empirical studies to assess the value creation of acquisitions (Asquith, Bruner and 
Mullins, 1983; Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller, 2002; Kolasinski and Li, 2013; Masulis, Wang 
and Xie, 2007). Other possible measures include long-term abnormal stock returns, long-term 
accounting measures as well as subjective performance measures as synergy realisation, 
integration process performance and employee retention (Zollo and Meier, 2008). 
Contrary to Zollo and Meier (2008), Sirower and O’Byrne (1998:108) find that short-term 
abnormal stock returns after an announcement of an acquisition are highly correlated with 
long-term stock performance and their measure of post-acquisition operating performance. In 
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contrast, Zollo and Meier (2008) state that stock returns only show the market expectation 
about firm performance. The appropriateness of short-term window event studies as a proxy 
for M&A performance is still discussed among researchers. According to Sirower and 
O’Byrne (1998), study findings indicate that the market’s response to an acquisition 
announcement yields an unprejudiced forecast of the acquisition’s long-term impact and thus, 
it signifies M&A performance. 
3.5.2. (Cumulative) abnormal Returns 
In order to measure the performance of each valid M&A of our research sample, the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) observed around the acquisition announcement date are 
calculated. Therefore, the standard event study methodology by Brown and Warner (1985) is 
applied. 
Day ‘0’ is defined as the event day, the date of the acquisition announcement, and the ‘event 
period’ is the three-day period (-1, +1) around the announcement date (Baker et al., 2012; 
Conn et al., 2004; Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2005). Compared to monthly return data, 
daily return data measures abnormal returns more accurately enabling a better, informative 
identification of announcement effects, according to Khotari and Warner (1997). To calculate 
the daily abnormal return (AR), different models can be applied such as the mean-adjusted 
return model, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the market model or the market-
adjusted model (Brown and Warner, 1985; Khotari and Warner, 2006; MacKinlay, 1997). 
In this research study, we deploy the market-adjusted model, following previous research 
studies (Aktas, Bodt and Roll, 2006; Conn et al., 2004; Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; Fuller, 
Netter and Stegemoeller, 2002;). MacKinlay (1997) argues that the market model is a better 
approach in order to identify and to analyse event effects on stock returns as the market-
adjusted model can imply biases due to limited data availability. However, according to 
Fuller, Netter and Stegemoeller (2002), the market-adjusted model can be applied because an 
estimation of the market parameters, prior the event day, is unreliable if companies acquire 
frequently. Hence, their takeover efforts would be included in the estimation period. 
Therefore, the market-adjusted model does not estimate the market-model parameters and so 
the inclusion of an estimation period is not required.7 Besides, Sirower and O’Byrne (1998) as 
                                                
7 For the market-adjusted model, the formula of the market model is applied: Ai, t = Ri,t – αi – βi Rm,t. As market 
parameters are not estimated by running regressions over an estimation period, α is set to 0 and ß to 1. 
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well as Malmendier and Tate (2008) find similar results for the market-model and the market-
adjusted model.8 
The daily abnormal return over the three-day event window is calculated by using following 
formula, derived from Brown and Warner (1985): 
   
By subtracting the normal expected returns ‘Rm,t’, determined by the FTSE All-Share Index, 
of the actual returns ‘Ri,t’ of the company ‘i’, the daily abnormal returns ‘Ai,t’ are obtained. 
The normal expected return ‘Rm,t’ implies the return in case the event would not have taken 
place (MacKinlay, 1997). In line with Doukas and Petmezas (2007), the FTSE All-Share 
index as benchmark for the normal expected return has been applied. 
The CAR for each M&A is the sum of the calculated abnormal returns over the three-day 
event window applying following formula (Khotari and Warner, 2006; MacKinlay, 1997): 
 
 
 
3.6. Variables 
3.6.1. Dependent Variable 
According to Brooks (2008), the dependent variable is influenced by explanatory variables 
and hence, changes in these variables can explain movements in the dependent variable. 
In this research study, the dependent variable is the CAR over a three-day event window 
around the acquisition announcement date, CAR3Day, which is calculated by using the event 
study methodology outlined above. CAR is used as stock returns reflect how events, like the 
announcement of an M&A, can impact a company’s shareholder value under the assumption 
of a rational market place (Khotari and Warner, 2006). Hence, it provides evidence whether 
M&As create or destroy shareholder value. Finally, we follow previous studies that use CAR 
as a dependent variable in order to test and to evaluate how different CEO traits as well as 
                                                
8 Conn et al. (2004) used alternative models to obtain abnormal returns by using a CAPM and a mean-adjusted 
model following, Brown and Warner (1985), in order to test the robustness of their results. The results of the 
market-adjusted and the alternative models were very similar. 
Ai, t = Ri,t – Rm,t 
       t+1  
CARi (t-1, t+1) = Σ Ai,t 
    t = t-1 
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deal characteristics and firm factors impact the short- and long-run performance of a company 
(Aktas, de Bodt and Roll., 2006; Conn et al., 2004; Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2005).  
3.6.2 Independent Variables 
Independent variables are considered in a regression model in order to explain how variations 
in their values explain changes in the regressand (Brooks, 2008). Each explanatory variable 
represents one of the hypotheses described in section 2.7.. 
The first considered explanatory variable of interest represents the age of the CEO at the 
announcement date of the acquisition. Following previous studies, we apply Age as a linear 
variable as well as by grouping it into differently defined categories like ‘young’, ‘medium’ 
and ‘old’ (Yim, 2013) or ‘five-year age groups’ (Levi, Li and Zhang, 2010). Thereby, we 
control for the potential linear relationship between age and tenure. Hypothesis 1 implicates 
that younger CEOs have weaker short-term M&A performance. Hence, the variable Age 
positively affects the CARs around the announcement day. 
CEOTenure is measured as the number of years the CEO holds his/ her position in the 
company until the announcement of an M&A. Yim (2013) uses tenure as a control variable to 
explain the degree of power of CEOs while Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) include the 
variable in order to control for knowledge development and enhancement. For this research, 
tenure is defined as a measure for the CEO’s commitment to the firm and as a signal for 
experience, following Fung, Jo and Tsai (2009). As a result, our hypothesis signifies that the 
variable CEOTenure has a positive coefficient value.  
In addition to the CEO’s tenure, this study is the first, according to our knowledge, to include 
the overall tenure of the CEO within the firm as a variable of interest in order to measure 
experience, commitment and knowledge development. The overall tenure represents the time 
period the current CEO is connected to the company, i.e. also as non-executive director prior 
to his/ her appointment as CEO.9 Our hypothesis implies a positive effect the variable 
FirmTenure on the CARs around the acquisition announcement day. 
The board positions of a CEO in other companies are included as a dummy variable. The 
variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO has a board position in another firm and the value of 0 
if he/ she has not. Outside directorship as an independent variable has been studied by Byrd 
                                                
9 The years of the CEO being with another company, that got acquired at a later stage by one of the sample 
companies, are not included in the calculation of the CEO tenure as well as firm tenure. 
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and Hickman (1992) in terms of directors holding several external directorships. In line with 
the fourth hypothesis, we measure the impact of CEOs holding outside board positions as a 
sign of independent judgement and better corporate decision-making. Hence, the 
BoardOutside variable is expected to have a positive coefficient value. 
Previous CEO experience is measured as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a CEO has 
previous CEO experience in another company; otherwise it takes the value of 0. In 
accordance to our fifth hypothesis, we assume that CEOs with previous CEO experience are 
executing more overconfident behaviour than CEOs without previous CEO experience. 
Therefore, there is a negative relationship between the variable Experience and the CAR 
around the acquisition announcement day. 
The EducationBT dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO has a business and a 
technical educational background.10 The dummy variable carries the value of 0 if the CEO has 
not both educational backgrounds. Based on hypothesis 6a, we assume a negative coefficient 
for EducationBT. In addition, we include the dummy variables BusinessOnly and 
TechnicalOnly that take the value of 1 if the CEO has only a business or only a technical 
background respectively; otherwise the variables take the value of 0. The variables are 
included to see whether business education has a negative influence on CAR3Day, stated in 
hypothesis 6b. The technical education background is chosen as comparison because most of 
our sample companies operate in a scientific industry. 
Finally, ThreeOrMore indicates whether one CEO has executed three or more acquisitions in 
the ten-year sample period. The dummy variable holds the value of 1 if the same CEO has 
pursued three or more acquisitions and the value of 0 if he/ she has undertaken one or two 
acquisitions. As this variable can be defined as a proxy for high acquisitiveness of CEOs, as 
stated in hypothesis 7, we assume that the variable ThreeOrMore negatively impacts the CAR 
around the announcement day. 
3.6.3. Control Variables 
Firm- and deal-specific variables are included as control variables to capture the effect of 
different characteristics of the acquirers as well as the M&A deals on the market’s response to 
                                                
10 Following Malmendier and Tate (2008), a CEO has a business education if he/ she holds an undergraduate or 
graduate degree (including MBA) in accounting, business, finance or economics. A CEO has a technical 
education if he/ she holds an undergraduate or graduate degree in engineering, chemistry, physics, biology, 
geology, medicine, pharmacy or other applied sciences. 
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acquisition announcements. For the firm-specific variables, data of the acquirer’s latest annual 
report of the fiscal year prior the acquisition announcement has been used (Baker et al., 2012; 
Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2007). The following variables are chosen, based on previous 
empirical research studying M&As and their definition of firm- and deal-specific control 
variables.  
• FirstDeal indicates if an undertaken M&A is the first deal performed by a CEO. We 
control for this variable as first deals can result in higher abnormal returns around the 
acquisition announcement day than successive deals, according to Doukas and 
Petmezas (2007). 
• DealSize is defined as the total transaction value in millions of GBP paid by the 
acquirer for the target firm. It is included in order to control for the impact of a deal-
specific variable on the abnormal stock returns around the acquisition announcement 
day (Aktas, de Bodt and Roll, 2006; Baker et al., 2012; Moeller, Schlingemann and 
Stulz, 2005). 
• Assets are the total assets stated on the company’s balance sheet and the variable is 
included in order to control for firm size (Ferris, Jayaram and Sabherwal, 2013; Yim, 
2013). According to Ferris, Jayaram and Sabherwal (2013), firm size has a positive 
and statistically significant effect on the CEO’s offer behaviour. 
• Market capitalisation, MarketCap, is derived by multiplying the company’s ordinary 
shares outstanding by the ordinary share price representing the acquirer’s total market 
value of equity in millions of GBP (Baker et al., 2012). 
• Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of assets over the book value of assets in 
order to control for the investment opportunities of the acquiring firm (Ferris, Jayaram 
and Sabherwal, 2013). According to Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007), Q has a negative 
effect on the acquirer’s return. 
• Return on assets (ROA)11 is included as the firm-specific control variable ROA 
defined as the profit generated by the firm in relation to its asset base. It is included as 
a measure to control for the acquiring firm’s operating performance (Serfling, 2014; 
Yim, 2013). 
                                                
11 S&P Capital IQ defines ROA as following: ROA = (EBIT*0.625)/((Total Assetst + Total Assetst-1)/2). 
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• Operating cash flow12, OpCF, represents the available internal resources in order to 
finance a firm’s investments like acquisitions (Ferris, Jayaraman and Sabherwal, 
2013). Besides the empire-building motives of CEOs associated with free cash flows, 
a high amount of cash flow might also indicate the well-performing status of a 
company due to the CEOs ability to execute better acquisitions according to Masulis, 
Wang and Xie (2007).  
• Capital Expenditures, CapEx, represents a company’s investment activity and is 
defined as cash expenditures on tangible fixed assets representing cash outflows in 
regards to the purchase of property, plant and equipment (Ferris, Jayaraman and 
Sabherwal, 2013; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Yim, 2013).  
• The variable Solvency represents the long-term solvency of a firm and it is measured 
as total debt divided by total capital.13 A higher leverage of the acquirer can reduce the 
CEO’s ability to pursue empire-building as financial institutions also control and 
monitor the actions of CEOs (Baker et al., 2012). In addition, leverage represents a 
corporate governance mechanism as future free cash flow is limited. Thus, it reduces 
the CEO’s ability to use it in order to pursue their own benefits, according to Masulis, 
Wang and Xie (2007). They conclude that leverage can play a pivotal role in 
preventing CEOs to pursue value-destroying acquisitions. 
• Operating income14, OpInc, is included as a firm-specific variable to control for the 
influence of a firm’s operating performance on the abnormal stock returns around the 
acquisition announcement day (Ferris, Jayaraman and Sabherwal, 2013). 
Except for FirstDeal, Q, ROA and Solvency, the natural logarithm is applied to the control 
variables, re-scaling the obtained data, in order to smooth the extreme observation values 
compared to the dependent variable (Brooks, 2008). 
 
                                                
12 S&P Capital IQ calculates operating cash flow as following: CFOp. = net income + depreciation and 
amortisation + amortisation of deferred charges, total (-CF) + other non-cash items, total + change in net 
operating assets. 
13 S&P Capital IQ defines total debt/total capital as following: total debt/(total preferred equity + total common 
equity + total debt + minority interest). 
14 S&P Capital IQ calculates operating income as following: Operating income = Total revenue – operating 
expenses – cost of goods sold – selling, general and administrative expenses – R&D – depreciation and 
amortization – other operating expenses/ income. 
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3.7. Regression 
3.7.1. Regression Design 
The sample consists of firm-deal-level observations. Consequently, panel data is used because 
both cross-sections (companies) as well as time series (announcement dates) are in place. We 
have an unbalanced panel data since the number of time-observations is not the same for 
every cross-sectional unit. Panel data provides the possibility to deal with more complex 
problems by combining cross-sectional observations with developments in time. Moreover, 
panel data can improve the power of the regression by increasing degrees of freedom (Brooks, 
2008). We run multivariate regressions using the software EViews 8. The coefficient estimates 
are determined by applying the ordinary least square (OLS) method. Thereby, the significance 
of each coefficient is obtained from the t-statistic derived from EViews 8. The regressions are 
based on the following equations: 
[1]  
 
 
As mentioned above, several deal-specific and firm-specific control variables are included to 
account for other important influence factors on the CAR around an acquisition’s 
announcement day. X represents the set of control variables as outlined in section 3.6.3.. 
[2]  
 
 
Generally, several assumptions have to be fulfilled for the OLS method to be valid. Thus, 
different tests are performed to confirm the validity of the assumptions and to identify 
measures that can be applied to deviations. 
3.7.2. Regression Assumptions 
• Testing for Multicollinearity 
Before running the regressions, we test for multicollinearity by looking at the correlation 
matrix between individual independent variables. ‘Near multicollinearity’ occurs when 
explanatory variables are highly correlated with each other and as a common rule of thumb, 
α + β1 Ageit+ β2 CEOTenureit + β3 FirmTenureit + β4 BoardOutsideit 
+ β5 Experienceit + β6 EducationBTit + β7 BusinessOnlyit 
+ β8 TechnicalOnlyit + β9 ThreeOrMoreit + εit 
CAR3Dayit = 
CAR3Dayit = α + β1 Ageit+ β2 CEOTenureit + β3 FirmTenureit + β4 BoardOutsideit 
+ β5 Experienceit + β6 EducationBTit + β7 BusinessOnlyit 
+ β8 TechnicalOnlyit + β9 ThreeOrMoreit + γ Xit + εit 
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the values -0.8 and 0.8 are used as thresholds (Brooks, 2008). Multicollinearity can cause 
crucial problems since individual variables will have large standard errors and are likely to be 
insignificant. Furthermore, the regression gets sensitive to the inclusion and omission of 
variables. Therefore, we follow Brook’s (2008) approach and drop one of the collinear 
variables if multicollinearity is detected. 
• Testing for Heterogeneity 
The ‘final OLS regression’ is also tested for heterogeneity bias which implies that the error 
terms in the cross-sectional or in the period dimension deviate systematically from zero, 
resulting in large residual sum of squares. Heterogeneity violates the OLS assumption that 
independent variables are uncorrelated with the error term.15 The inclusion of fixed effects for 
each cross-sectional unit or for each time period can solve the problem of heterogeneity by 
picking up systematic deviations of the error term and pushing down the residuals to minimise 
their deviation from zero. Thereby, the fixed-effects model introduces a different intercept for 
each cross-sectional unit or time period, respectively (Brooks, 2008). Thus, we already 
account for certain forms of omitted variables bias in the regression. 
Following Ferris, Jayaraman and Sabherwal (2013) and Yim (2013), year-fixed effects are 
applied in order to control for time-varying effects that are constant cross-sectionally. The 
inclusion of year-fixed effects is likely to be crucial since mergers occur in aggregate waves 
(Gaughan, 2011; Yim, 2013) and since we cover the period of the financial crisis in our 
sample. Due to the fact, that the sample’s time identifier is the announcement date of the 
acquisition, we manually include year dummy variables for the year in which the acquisition 
is announced. The distribution of acquisition announcements during the ten-year time period 
can be seen in table 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 Cov (ut, xt) = 0 
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Moreover, cross-sectional fixed effects are included to control for unobservable company-
specific effects that are time-invariant (Brooks, 2008; Yim, 2013). Our sample contains many 
companies with only one or two observations during the ten-year period. Using time-invariant 
effects for single observations or two observations that are far apart in time is unnecessary. 
Consequently, cross-sectional unit dummy variables are manually included, only for the 
companies that have three or more acquisition announcements during the observed time 
period. 
Since manual dummy variables are included, the redundant fixed effects test in EViews cannot 
be applied. Instead, heterogeneity is detected if some year and cross-sectional unit dummy 
variables, respectively, are statistically significant. In that case, their inclusion adds 
explanatory power. However, including year and cross-sectional unit dummy variables 
decreases the degrees of freedom. Brooks (2008) argues that including insignificant variables 
can negatively affect the significance of other variables by increasing the standard errors and 
by using up degrees of freedom. Thus, we exclude all control variables as well as manual year 
and cross-sectional unit dummy variables that have a p-value above 0.15. 
• Testing for Heteroscedasticity 
Another OLS assumption implies that the error term has a constant variance.16 If the 
requirement is not fulfilled, the errors are said to be heteroscedastic (Brooks, 2008). To test 
whether the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity must be rejected, a manual Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey test is performed. In doing so, the residual series of the regression, including manual 
                                                
16 Var (ut) = σ² < ∞ 
Table 1: Distribution of acquisition announcements between 2004 and 2013 
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fixed effects, is squared. Afterwards, the independent variables are run on the squared 
residuals. If heteroscedasticity is detected, White robust standard errors will be applied to 
account for this problem (Brooks, 2008). 
• Testing for Autocorrelation 
The residuals of the OLS regression are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other over 
time.17 If autocorrelation is detected, the OLS estimates are still unbiased but the inferences 
are incorrect. Testing for autocorrelation can be done with the Durbin-Watson test. It tests for 
first order autocorrelation, implying that it focuses on the relationship between the residual 
and the immediately previous one (Brooks, 2008). A Durbin-Watson statistic close to 2 
indicates no autocorrelation. A value close to 0 detects positive autocorrelation whereas a 
value close to 4 identifies negative autocorrelation. 
• Testing for Normality 
To test whether the residuals fulfil the requirements of normal distribution18, the Jarque-Bera 
test is applied. If the null hypothesis of normal distribution is rejected, non-normality is 
detected. The test includes the third and fourth moments of a distribution, namely its 
skewness and kurtosis. The normal distribution has a skewness of 1, which implies that the 
residuals are symmetrically distributed around its mean, and a kurtosis coefficient of 3. 
Kurtosis is a measure to determine how fat the tails of a distribution are. A distribution with 
kurtosis greater than 3 is said to be leptokurtic whereas a distribution with kurtosis smaller 
than 3 is called platykurtic19 (Brooks, 2008). Dealing with financial and economic data, it is 
quite common not to have a normal distributed residual series. One can either transform the 
variables by using the natural logarithm to smooth outliers or use dummy variables to exclude 
outliers (Brooks, 2008). In our case, the logarithm cannot be applied to the dependent variable 
CAR3Day due to many negative observations. Besides, excluding outliers artificially 
improves the fit of the model and valuable information gets lost. Therefore, an additional 
robustness test is performed in which outliers are excluded to compare the results with the full 
sample regression. 
                                                
17 Cov (ui, uj) = 0  
18 ut ~ N (0, σ²)  
19 Leptokurtic implies fatter tails and a higher peak at the mean compared to a normal distribution. In contrast, a 
platykurtic distribution has thinner tails and is less peaked than the normal distribution (Brooks, 2008). 
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3.7.3. Further Robustness Tests 
In order to further verify the findings of the ‘final regression’, some variables and conditions 
are slightly modified. 
• Dependent Variable: CAR5Day 
Due to the fact that Doukas and Petmezas (2007) as well as Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller 
(2002) use a five-day window around the acquisition’s announcement day, we test whether 
the regression results considerably change by substituting the dependent variable CAR3day 
with CAR5day. CAR5Day is calculated following the same methodology as CAR3Day, 
outlined in section 3.5.2.. 
• Age Groups and CEOTenure Groups 
Following Levi, Li and Zhang (2010), Kolasinski and Li (2013) and Yim (2013), the variable 
Age is altered to binary variables corresponding to three or five age groups, respectively. 
Using age terciles, the first age group YoungCEO comprises CEOs between 40 and 52, the 
second age group MidAgeCEO consists of CEOs being 53-58 years old and OldCEO are 
CEOs between 59 and 65. MidAgeCEO presents the omitted group that is not included in the 
regression. The distribution of CEOs into five age groups can be seen in table 2 below, where 
AgeGroupV presents the omitted group. 
Due to a likely correlation between Age, CEOTenure and FirmTenure, the application of 
groups ensures a non-linear relationship to be able to correctly identify the effect of each 
variable (Yim, 2013). Based on the same explanation, the variables CEOTenureLessFive and 
CEOTenureFive are included in further regressions. Moreover, including these binary 
variables for CEOTenure controls for potential selection bias in our sample. If young CEOs 
are hired by companies that are planning to engage in acquisition activities, the effect of Age 
on abnormal returns should be lower for short-tenured CEOs (less than five years) than for 
long-tenured CEOs (Yim, 2013). 
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yes (DV=1) no (DV=0)
YoungCEO (40-52) 69 95
MidageCEO (53-58) 61 103
OldCEO (59-65) 34 130
AgeGroupI (40-45) 8 156
AgeGroupII (46-50) 46 118
AgeGroupIII (51-55) 48 116
AgeGroupIV (56-60) 40 124
AgeGroupV (61-65) 22 142
CEOTenureLessFive 73 91
CEOTenureFive 91 73
Full-sample: 164 observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Period Sub-Samples: 2004-2007 and 2008-2013 
As a last robustness test, the sample is divided into two sub-samples, corresponding to the 
time period from 2004 to 2007 and from 2008 to 2013. Even though the length of the time 
period is unequal, this division enables us to gain conclusions how the financial crisis 
changed the influence of our variables of interest on CAR3Day. The time period 2004 to 2007 
covers the sixth merger wave (Gaughan, 2011) whereas the time period 2008 to 2013 
observes the acquisition performance at the peak of and after the financial crisis. A limitation 
of this approach is the small sample for each period with less than 100 acquisitions. 
The binary variable ThreeOrMore takes now the value 1 if the CEO pursues three or more 
acquisitions during the sub-sample period. Additionally, the cross-sectional unit dummy 
variables are only included for the companies having three or more time observations in the 
specific sub-sample time period. For the sub-sample regressions, we follow the same 
approach as for our full sample. Firstly, all control variables, year- as well as cross-sectional 
units dummy variables are included to test for their explanatory power. Secondly, those 
variables that are not statistically significant, p-value above 0.15, are excluded again.  
 
3.8 Validity and Limitations 
As this research study is based on data derived from several data sources, the potential of 
error sources increases. However, the data is taken from databases provided by reliable 
Table 2: Distribution of CEOs by Age and CEOTenure groups 
36 
 
financial market data providers like Thomson Reuters or the audited annual reports of the 
companies, enhancing the validity of our data. In order to account for the reliability of our 
data sample and thus, the interpretation of our empirical results, different limitations are 
outlined below. 
 
• Sample Size and Data Availability 
One of the main limitations of this study is the restricted sample size of 164 acquisition 
announcements over a ten-year time period (appendix A). Due to the fact that the data has to 
be hand-collected from different data sources, we only focus on acquisitions of FTSE 100 
companies, representing the UK as the main takeover market in Europe (CMS, 2013). 
Consequently, we are only able to draw inferences about the effect of CEO characteristics on 
CARs of acquisition announcements in the UK. After applying the defined restrictions to the 
companies (appendix B) and their acquisitions, only 56 companies are included in our full-
sample. As a consequence of the small sample size, it is more difficult to find significant and 
valid results and potential biases may arise.  
• Omission of Variables of Interest 
Many studies apply specific governance variables to analyse their influence and importance 
on M&A performance. Especially the number of CEOs who are also chairman of the board at 
the same company, known as CEO duality, is often included as a measure of CEO power over 
the board (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Since the UK corporate governance code includes the 
elimination of CEO duality (Tricker, 2012), we cannot investigate this variable in our sample. 
Besides, all CEOs in our sample serve as executive directors in the board of their company. 
Therefore, the analysis of the impact of inside board membership on CARs is also not 
possible. As a result, only the governance variable BoardOutside is applied in the multivariate 
regression analyses. 
• Financial Crisis 2007/2008 
Due to the fact that the full-sample includes the financial crisis of 2007/2008, the CARs of 
acquisition announcements might be more affected by the economic downturn than actually 
representing the influence of CEO characteristics. In addition, the crisis succeeded the sixth 
merger wave, also representing a deviation from normal market developments. 
We account for this problem by including year fixed effects and by running a robustness test 
with sub-samples, covering pre-and post-crisis acquisitions. However, including the financial 
37 
 
crisis in our time period has also the objective to investigate whether the financial crisis has a 
substantial and persistent effect on the influence of CEO characteristics on M&A 
performance. Nevertheless, due to the statistical small number of observations, the sub-
samples do not allow for significant conclusions.  
• Market-adjusted Model 
Another potential weakness of this research approach is the use of the market-adjusted model. 
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997:156) recommend only to apply the market-adjusted 
model as a “last resort” since biases are likely to arise. Since the market parameters α and β 
are not estimated over an estimation-window, the calculated abnormal returns will be wrong if 
the restriction of α equal to 0 and β equal to 1 is false. The advantage of using the market 
model is that it removes exactly the part of the stock return that is related to the development 
of the market’s return. Thus, the calculated abnormal returns are able to detect the influence 
of a certain event (MacKinlay, 1997). Nevertheless, as mentioned before, many previous 
studies have used the market-adjusted model to measure CARs around an acquisition 
announcement and it is confirmed that the market model and the market-adjusted model yield 
similar results (Fuller, Netter and Stegemoeller, 2002; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Sirower 
and O’Byrne, 1998).  
• Endogeneity 
A common problem, when dealing with corporate financial data, is endogeneity. Endogeneity 
is present when one or several independent variables are correlated with the error term of the 
regression. The existence of endogeneity is problematic because it leads to biased and 
inconsistent parameters (Roberts and Whited, 2012). The main potential causes of 
endogeneity in our regressions are omitted variables and measurement error. We already 
account for some forms of omitted variables bias by including cross-sectional unit and period 
fixed effects (Brooks, 2008). Nevertheless, potentially important variables might still be 
omitted in this study due to time and data limitations, such as diversifying merger, cash or 
stock payment and private or public target. These variables are likely to influence the short-
term CARs as well as one or more of the independent variables. Measurement error refers to 
the discrepancies between the true variable of interest and the proxy (Roberts and Whited, 
2012). Since we use, for instance, CAR3Day as a proxy for short-term M&A performance and 
ThreeOrMore as a proxy for high acquisitiveness, results have to be interpreted carefully.  
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4. Empirical Results 
This chapter summarises the empirical findings derived from our sample of 164 acquisition 
announcements. First, the statistics of the variables are presented; second the results of the 
fundamental regressions are outlined and third, the ‘final regression’ results are compared to 
the results of the robustness tests. 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Looking at the dependent variable, one can identify that the median CAR over the three-day 
window around the acquisition’s announcement day is 0.27% and its mean is 0.45%. Thus, 
we can confirm the statement that, on average, acquiring firms fail to achieve substantial 
value creation (Roll, 1986; Sirower and O’Byrne, 1998). The abnormal returns range from a 
minimum value of -20.56% up to a maximum value of 13.52%. The distribution of the 
CAR3day observations is negatively skewed and leptokurtic.  
As presented in table 3, the median CEO in our full sample is 53 years old, has five years of 
tenure and has worked for the company for 11.5 years. The age of CEOs undertaking 
acquisitions varies from 40 years to 65 years in our sample. CEOTenure and FirmTenure 
range from 0 years to 27 years and 42 years, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 shows the number of observations for each dummy variable included in the full-
sample as well as in the sub-sample periods. Remarkably, nearly 90% of the full-sample 
CEOs hold an outside board position whereas less than 50% have previous CEO experience. 
Table 3: Statistical measures for CAR3day, Age, CEOTenure and FirmTenure 
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The majority of the acquisitions are done by CEOs who have a business education and only a 
few CEOs hold double-degrees. Overall, 47 acquisitions are announced by CEOs which have 
already undertaken at least three acquisitions.  
 
 
 
 
Taking a closer look at the absolute values of deal- and firm-specific control variables 
(appendix E), the deal values cover a wide range from GBP 4 million (m) to GBP 9,635 m. 
The median deal size of GBP 193 m is far apart from the mean deal value of GBP 656 m, 
indicating outliers. Similarly, the variables Assets and MarketCap have large standard 
deviations from their mean of GBP 11,657 m and GBP 12,598 m, respectively. The sample 
firms have on average positive operating cash flows, (mean: GBP 1,329 m; median GBP 390 
m), positive ROA (mean: 7.69%; median: 6.95%) and positive operating incomes (mean: 
GBP 1,181 m; median: GBP 369 m). However, negative observations for these variables are 
also found in the firm sample. The sample companies invest on average (mean) GBP 6,669 m 
in property plan and investment, represented by the variable CapEx. The variable Q has a 
mean of 1.64 and 162 observations ranging from 0.42 to 7.29. The mean total debt to capital 
ratio, represented by the variable Solvency, is 38.70%, but also ratios above 100% are 
observed.  
 
yes (1) no (0) yes (1) no (0) yes (1) no (0)
BoardOutside 144 20 66 11 78 9
Experience 72 92 36 41 36 51
EducationBT 21 143 8 68 13 74
BusinessOnly 99 65 48 29 51 36
TechnicalOnly 24 140 14 63 10 77
ThreeOrMore 47 117 9 68 21 66
FirstDeal 75 89 44 33 31 56
Full-sample: 164 
observations
Sub-sample 2004-2007: 
77 observations
Sub-sample 2008-2013: 
87 observations
Table 4: Distribution of observations for all dummy variables  
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4.2. Regression Model 
4.2.1. Multicollinearity 
As a result of the correlation matrix (appendix F), ‘near multicollinearity’ is detected between 
the variables ln_MarketCap and ln_Assets, as well as between ln_OpCF and ln_Assets and 
between ln_CapEx and ln_Assets. Moreover, ln_OpCF and ln_CapEx are both highly 
correlated to ln_MarketCap. Consequently, the variables ln_MarketCap, ln_OpCF and 
ln_CapEx are not integrated in the regression, since their inclusion would disturb the OLS 
estimations. The matrix shows that there is no problem of multicollinearity between the 
variables of interests. Age and CEOTenure have a correlation coefficient of 0.2992 and the 
correlation coefficient of CEOTenure and FirmTenure is 0.4378. Consequently, equation 2, 
introduced in section 3.7.1., is specified as: 
[2]  
 
 
 
4.2.2. Multivariate Regressions 
Table 5 presents the regression results for the four fundamental regressions, based on equation 
1 and 2, as stated in section 3.7.1 and 4.2.1, as well as the application of year- and company 
dummy variables.  
Looking at the results of regression 1, one can see that none of the variables of interest is 
statistically significant. Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of 
the variables are 0 with certainty (Brooks, 2008). Following equation 2, regression 2 includes 
control variables to account for deal- and firm-specific factors that potentially influence 
CARs. Unexpectedly, the included control variables do not explain any variation in the 
dependent variable CAR3Day. The positive coefficient values of ROA, ln_DealSize and 
ln_OpInc, and the negative coefficients of the variables FirstDeal, ln_Assets, Q and Solvency 
are not statistically significant. Compared to regression 1, regression 2 shows very similar 
coefficient results for the variables of interest and they are still statistically insignificant.  
Focusing on regression 3, the manual inclusion of year- as well as cross-sectional dummy 
variables to account for heterogeneity in both dimensions changes the regression results for 
α + β1 Ageit+ β2 CEOTenureit + β3 FirmTenureit + β4 BoardOutsideit 
+ β5 Experienceit + β6 EducationBTit + β7 BusinessOnlyit 
+ β8 TechnicalOnlyit + β9 ThreeOrMoreit + β10 FirstDealit 
+ β11 ln_Dealsizeit + β12 ln_Assetsit + β13 Qit + β14 ROAit + β15 Solvencyit 
+ β16 ln_OpIncit + εit 
CAR3Dayit = 
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the variables of interest. Nevertheless, all control variables are still statistically insignificant. 
As mentioned in section 3.7.2., we exclude all insignificant control variables as well as 
insignificant year and company dummy variables in order to save degrees of freedom. The 
remaining dummy variables are listed in table 5 under regression 4. As a result, regression 4 is 
considered as the ‘final regression’ and its results are used to interpret the seven defined 
hypotheses. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0.0006 0.0002 0.0024 0.0027
(0.8504) (0.2474) (2.1351)** (3.6769)***
CEOTenure -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0031 -0.0015
(-0.6913) (-0.7742) (-1.8028)* (-1.8071)*
FirmTenure 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0003
(0.0959) (-0.2429) (0.6454) (0.6857)
BoardOutside 0.0139 0.0052 0.0009 -0.0011
(1.2903) (0.4735) (0.0689) (-0.1065)
Experience -0.0025 -0.0063 -0.0007 -0.0011
(-0.2935) (-0.7649) (-0.0568) (-0.1425)
EducationBT -0.0198 -0.0130 -0.0310 -0.0301
(-1.4065) (-0.9078) (-1.3311) (-2.1263)**
BusinessOnly -0.0148 -0.0172 -0.0144 -0.0036
(-1.3236) (-1.5656) (-0.8574) (-0.3403)
TechnicalOnly -0.0041 -0.0063 -0.0112 -0.0073
(-0.2959) (-0.4633) (-0.5707) (-0.5359)
ThreeOrMore -0.0098 -0.0098 -0.0135 -0.0285
(-1.1418) (-1.0318) (-1.1229) (-3.2991)***
Constant -0.0203 0.0474 -0.0306 -0.1070
(-0.5182) (1.0305) (-0.4451) (-2.6263)***
Control Variables No Yes Yes No
Year-Fixed No No Yes Several
Cross-Section Fixed No No Yes Several
R² 0.0456 0.0613 0.3644 0.2846
adjusted-R² -0.0102 -0.0437 0.0642 0.1788
F-stat 0.8174 0.5836 1.2140 2.6897
Prob (F-stat.) 0.6009 0.8923 0.1999 0.0003
TABLE 5: The table reports the coefficient results of OLS regressions using the sample of 164 acquisitions of FTSE 100 
companies from 2004 to 2013. The dependent variable refers to the CAR over a three day window around the acquisition 
announcement (CAR3Day). The variables of interest are defined as outlined in section 3.6.2. Regression (1) is based on  equation 
1 (section 3.7.1) without controling for any firm-specific characteristics. Regression (2) is based on  equation 2 (section 4.2.1) with 
the inclusion of the following control variables: FirstDeal, ln_Dealsize, ln-Assets, Q, ROA, Solvency, ln_OpInc. The control 
variables are defined as outlined in section 3.6.3. Regression (3) is based on equation 2 and further includes year-fixed effects as 
well as cross-sectional unit dummy variables for companies that have  three or more acquisitions during the ten-year time period. 
Those companies include ABF, AstraZeneca, Babcock, BAE_Systems, Capita, Centrica, Experian, GKN, GSK, IMI, Intertek, 
Johnson_Matthey, Meggitt, Pearson, Persimmon, Reckitt_Benckiser, Reed_Elsevier, Rexam, Shire, Travis_Perkins, Tullow_Oil, 
Vodafone, Weir, William_Hill, Wolseley, WPP. Regression (4) is based on regression (3) and exclude all control variables and year- 
and cross-sectional unit dummy variables with p-values above 0.15. Year dummy variables are incldued for the years 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2008, 2009. Cross-sectional units dummy variables are included for the companies AstraZeneca, IMI, Rexam, Shire, Weir, 
William_Hill, Wolseley. Regression (4) represents the 'final regression'. It is the foundation for the robustness tests as well as the 
discussion. T-statistics are shown in paranthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 5: Multivariate regressions based on equations 1 and 2 
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The variable Age has a positive coefficient which indicates that the older the CEO is, the more 
positive are the CARs of the acquisition announcements. More precisely, one year increase in 
age leads to an increase of abnormal returns of 0.27% which implies that an age difference of 
five years affects the abnormal returns by over 1%. The coefficient is statistically significant 
at a 1% significance level. Consequently, our first hypothesis is confirmed. 
In contrast to Age, CEOTenure has a negative effect on CAR3Days. An increase of the CEO 
tenure by one year leads to a decrease of abnormal returns of 0.15%. The coefficient value is 
statistically significant at a 10% significance level. Due to the negative and significant 
coefficient, our second hypothesis must be rejected. FirmTenure has a slightly positive 
coefficient but it is not statistically significant. Hence, the third hypothesis can be neither 
confirmed nor rejected. 
The dummy variables BoardOutside and Experience have both a negative influence on CARs 
around the acquisition announcements but their effect is not statistically significant. 
Consequently, for each variable we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the variable does not 
explain any variation in CAR3Day. Thus, we can neither confirm nor reject the fourth and the 
fifth hypothesis with certainty.  
The dummy variable EducationBT has a negative coefficient value of -0.0301, indicating a 
strong negative influence on the short-term CARs around acquisition announcements. It is 
statistically significant at a 5% significance level. Hence, we confirm hypothesis 6a. The 
coefficients of the variables BusinessOnly and TechnicalOnly are both negative but their t-
statistics are insignificant. Thus, hypothesis 6b cannot be confirmed since BusinessOnly does 
not indicate a stronger negative influence on CAR3Day compared to TechnicalOnly. 
The last variable of interest, ThreeOrMore, is statistically significant at a 1% significance 
level. The coefficient value of -0.0285 implies a negative effect on CARs. Hence, the last 
hypothesis, indicating a negative influence of high acquisitiveness on abnormal stock returns 
around acquisition announcements, is confirmed. 
Compared to the first pooled regression, regression 4 shows an increase of around 20% of the 
goodness of fit. The regression is statistically significant at a 1% significance level due to an 
F-test of 2.6897. The Durbin-Watson statistics of 2.2066 indicates no severe problem of 
autocorrelation. Furthermore, the performed Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test does not indicate 
the presence of heteroscedasticity. Thus, we can conclude that the assumption of 
homoscedasticity holds. 
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4.3. Robustness Tests 
 
 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Age 0.0015 0.0028 0.0025 0.0025 8.97E-05 0.0014
(2.3861)** (3.4126)*** (3.3725)*** (3.3725)*** (0.0828) (1.4235)
YoungCEO (40-52) -0.0213
(-2.6814)***
OldCEO (59-65) 0.0015
(0.1532)
AgeGroupI (40-45) -0.0567
(-2.8517)***
AgeGroupII (46-50) -0.0168
(-1.3044)
AgeGroupIII (51-55) -0.0073
(-0.5975)
AgeGroupIV (56-60) 0.0130
(1.0461)
CEOTenure -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0014 0.0017 -0.0021
(-1.3607) (-1.3314) (-1.0785) (-1.6125)* (1.0212) (-2.1817)**
CEOTenureLessFive 0.0064
(0.7835)
CEOTenureFive -0.0064
(-0.7835)
FirmTenure 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0001 8.17E-05 5.53E-05 0.0003
(1.0067) (0.2673) (0.2634) (0.9682) (0.1750) (0.1750) (0.0763) (0.5022)
BoardOutside -0.0069 -0.0074 0.0034 -0.0055 -0.0023 -0.0023 0.0342 -0.0016
(-0.7713) (-0.6384) (0.3200) (-0.5153) (-0.2181) (-0.2181) (1.9663)** (-0.1129)
Experience 0.0003 -0.0026 -0.0002 0.0020 0.0002 0.0002 0.0066 -0.0009
(-0.0438) (-0.2942) (-0.0190) (0.2493) (0.0282) (0.0282) (0.4832) (-0.0752)
EducationBT -0.0168 -0.0363 -0.0314 -0.0350 -0.0259 -0.0259 -0.0504 -0.0053
(-1.3740) (-2.2989)** (-2.1724)** (-2.4756)** (-1.8430)* (-1.8430)** (-1.8968)* (-0.3454)
BusinessOnly -0.0082 -0.0080 -0.0081 -0.0100 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0479 0.0094
(-0.8975) (-0.6731) (-0.7417) (-0.9317) (-0.1521) (-0.1521) (-2.2664)** (0.7160)
TechnicalOnly -0.0172 -0.0043 -0.0053 -0.0146 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0397 0.0139
(-1.4736) (-0.2858) (-0.3801) (-1.0372) (-0.0811) (-0.0811) (-1.6040) (0.7908)
ThreeOrMore -0.0234 -0.0255 -0.0253 -0.0258 -0.0312 -0.0312 0.0047 0.0015
(-3.1290)*** (-2.6438)*** (-2.9125)*** (-2.9132)*** (-3.6393)*** (-3.6393)*** (0.2735) (0.1400)
Constant -0.0493 -0.1000 0.0426 0.0468 -0.1097 -0.1033 0.0014 -0.0616
(-1.3743) (-2.1950)** (2.4832)** (2.4277)** (-2.4642)** (-2.4684)** (0.0244) (-1.1175)
Control Variables No No No No No No No No
Year-Fixed Several Several Several Several Several Several No One
Cross-Section Fixed Several Several Several Several Several Several One Several
R² 0.2398 0.2360 0.2630 0.3072 0.2713 0.2713 0.1532 0.2829
adjusted-R² 0.1233 0.1230 0.1481 0.1876 0.1635 0.1635 0.0249 0.1552
F-stat 2.0577 2.0887 2.2876 2.5680 2.5172 2.5172 1.1944 2.2154
Prob (F-stat.) 0.0073 0.0061 0.0020 0.0003 0.0007 0.0007 0.3109 0.0169
TABLE 6: The table reports the coefficient results of OLS regressions performed as robustness tests. Regressions (6) to (10) are based on the full sample of 
164 acquisitions of FTSE 100 companies from 2004 to 2013. Except for regression (6), the dependent variable refers to the CAR ver a three day window around 
the acquisition announcement (CAR3Day). The variables of interest are defined as outlined in section 3.6.2. Regression (5) to (10) apply the same year and 
cross-sectional unit dummy variables as regression (4) (see table 5). Hence, year dummy variables are incldued for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009. Cross-
sectional units dummy variables are included for the companies AstraZeneca, IMI, Rexam, Shire, Weir, William_Hill, Wolseley. Control variables are not 
included as in regression (4). Regression (5) is based on a sample of 159 acquisitions because acquisitions with extreme CAR3Day values are excluded to 
achieve a normality distribution of residuals. In regression (6), the dependent variable refers to the CAR over a five-day window around the acquisition 
announcement (CAR5Day). Regression (7) applies tercile age groups where MidAgeCEO (53-58) represents the omitted group. Regression (8) distributes the 
CEOs' age in five age groups and AgeGroupV (61-65) is the omitted group. Regression (9) uses the dummy variable CEOTenureLessFive instead of 
CEOTenure. Regression (10) includes the variable CEOTenureFive instead of CEOTenure. Regression (11) and (12) present the sub-samples for the years from 
2004 to 2007 and from 2008 to 2013, respectively. Regression (11) is based on a sample of 77 acquisitions. No year-fixed effects are included and one cross-
sectional dummy variable for the company Tullow_Oil is applied. Regression (12) is based on a sample of 87 acquisitions. A year dummy variable for 2008 is 
included as well as cross-sectional unit dummy variables for the companies Experian, Shire and Weir. T-statistics are shown in paranthesis. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 6: Robustness tests
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4.3.1. Exclusion of Outliers 
Due to the fact that the residuals of the ‘final regression’ are negatively skewed and 
leptokurtic, the Jarque-Bera test rejects the null hypothesis of normal distribution (appendix 
G). By excluding the five acquisitions that have the most extreme CAR3Day observations20 
from the regression, one can achieve normality of the residuals and artificially improve the fit 
of the regression. Looking at the results of regression 5 of table 6, one can see that two 
variables of interest are not statistically significant anymore, namely CEOTenure and 
EducationBT. Besides, the coefficient of Experience changes from being negative to slightly 
positive. However, all other variables follow the same trend as in the full-sample regression 
and Age and ThreeOrMore are still highly statistically significant. As a result, the authors are 
aware of the fact that the results of the full-sample regression have to be treated with caution. 
4.3.2. Dependent Variable: CAR5Day 
Using a five-day window around the acquisitions’ announcement days to calculate CARs, 
regression 6, yields overall the same results as regression 4. The only crucial difference is that 
CEOTenure is not statistically significant at a 10% significance level. 
4.3.3. Age Groups and CEOTenure Groups 
To account for the partial correlation between Age and CEOTenure, we replace Age by 
different age groups. Applying three age groups, regression 7, the variable YoungCEO is 
statistically significant at a 1% significance level and shows a strong negative influence of  
-2.13% on CAR3Day. In contrast, OldCEO shows a positive effect on CARs but the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. Looking at the regression with five age groups, 
regression 8, the results are very similar. AgeGroupI is statistically significant at a 1% 
significance level and has a strong negative coefficient. AgeGroupII, AgeGroupIII and 
AgeGroupIV are statistically insignificant but the coefficient trend goes from negative to 
positive for the oldest group. These regression results present an additional and strong 
confirmation of our first hypothesis. 
To further account for the correlation between Age and CEOTenure as well as for the 
correlation between CEOTenure and FirmTenure, CEOTenure is divided into two groups: 
                                                
20 The five most extreme CAR3Day observations belong to the acquisitions: ARM Holdings PLC- 23.08.04; 
Babcock International Group PLC- 10.05.07; GKN PLC- 05.07.12; Shire PLC- 21.04.05; Weir Group PLC- 
21.06.07. 
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CEOs, who have less than five year of CEO Tenure, CEOTenureLessFive, and CEOs having 
served five or more years as the CEO in the company announcing the acquisition, 
CEOTenureFive. The coefficient of the dummy variable CEOTenureLessFive has a positive 
effect, regression 9, whereas the coefficient CEOTenureFive is negative, regression 10, 
supporting our previous results. Nevertheless, both dummy variables are statistically 
insignificant in contrast to the linear CEOTenure variable. However, the coefficients of Age 
and FirmTenure are unaffected by the change which reinforces that the correlation between 
those variables does not interfere our results. 
4.3.4. Period Sub-Samples: 2004-2007 and 2008-2013 
Due to the fact that the financial crisis of 2007/2008 had a strong influence on M&A 
activities, it is tested whether it also had an influence on how CEO characteristics affect short-
term abnormal stock returns around the announcement day. Looking at the result of the sub-
panel from 2004 to 2007 (regression 11), the coefficient of Age is slightly positive but not 
statistically significant. In contrast to the results of the full-sample regression, the variables 
CEOTenure, FirmTenure, BoardOutside, Experience as well as ThreeOrMore have a positive 
influence on CAR3Day. The three education variables still negatively affect the CARs. The 
coefficients of BoardOutside, EducationBT and BusinessOnly are statistically significant. 
The sub-sample from 2008 to 2013, regression 12, substantially differs from the first sub-
sample. The positive coefficient value of the variable Age is still not statistically significant 
but its t-value increased from 0.0838 to 1.4235. CEOTenure is now statistically significant at 
a 5% significance level and has a negative influence on CAR3Day, which is in line with the 
results of our full-sample regression. Moreover, BoardOutside, Experience and EducationBT 
have a negative but insignificant coefficient. The fact that the coefficient of the variable 
ThreeOrMore is positive and statistically insignificant in both sub-samples is likely to be a 
result of the small number of CEOs, which pursue three or more acquisitions from 2004 to 
2007 and from 2008 to 2013, respectively.  
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5.  Discussion  
Overall, we confirm that CEO characteristics do have an important influence on short-term 
M&A performance. In the following, we make use of the theory of agency costs as well as the 
theory of overconfidence to explain our multivariate regression results. 
5.1. Age of the CEO 
H1: The acquisition undertaken by a young CEO has a weaker short-term 
M&A performance than the acquisition undertaken by an older CEO. 
Overall, the variable Age shows a significant and strong positive influence on short-term 
abnormal stock returns around the acquisition’s announcement. Thus, the confirmation of the 
first hypothesis supports Yim (2013), who finds lower, but statistically insignificant, 
acquisition announcement returns for younger CEOs. 
One the one hand, one can assume that these findings contradict the overconfidence theory 
since older people having more life-experience might be more likely to suffer from self-
attribution bias. On the other hand, Ferris, Jayaraman and Sabherwal (2013) emphasise that 
overconfidence is inversely related to age because older people are more cautious. This 
conclusion is also in line with Levi, Li and Zhang (2009) who state that older CEOs are less 
likely to pursue acquisitions for the purpose of demonstrating their dominance due to 
decreasing testosterone levels.  
Therefore, young CEOs are more risk-taking resulting in higher acquisitiveness than older 
CEOs who display more conservative decision-making behaviour (Bertrand and Schoar, 
2003; Serfling, 2014). Due to the fact that high acquisitiveness is likely to result in less value 
creating acquisitions, the market reacts negatively to acquisition announcements (Malmendier 
and Tate, 2008). The statistically significant and negative coefficient of YoungCEO in 
regression 7 and AgeGroupI in regression 8, respectively, as well as the positive coefficients 
for age groups consisting of older CEOs support this argumentation. 
Taking Yim’s (2013) findings into account, we cannot only draw inferences from the positive 
age coefficient about potential overconfidence but also about the theory of agency costs. More 
specifically, lower CARs for younger CEOs can be a result of imperfectly aligned incentive 
contracts. Younger CEOs pursue more acquisitions, disregarding value-creation for 
shareholders, because empire-building is unintendedly supported by the company (Masulis, 
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Wang and Xie, 2007; Yim, 2013). One of the most influencing factors might be the 
compensation policy. Most companies award their CEOs for acquisitions and the increase of 
the company’s size with long-term bonus contracts, which are unrelated to the post-
acquisition performance (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005). Thus, the age effect has revealed to be 
the strongest where the CEO has power to influence his/ her own compensation. Thereby, 
agency costs for shareholders are increased (Yim, 2013). Due to the fact that the age effect is 
indifferent from short- or long-tenured CEOs, we can reject the possibility that companies 
hire younger CEOs to pursue acquisitions (Yim, 2013). 
In order to make valuable propositions about whether overconfidence or incentive contracts 
have the most determining influence on the age effect in regards to short-term M&A 
performance, further research has to be conducted. 
 
5.2. CEO Tenure 
H2: The acquisition undertaken by a long-tenured CEO has a stronger short-
term M&A performance than the acquisition undertaken by a short-tenured 
CEO. 
The significant and negative influence of the variable CEOTenure on CAR3Day leads to a 
rejection of our second hypothesis.  
Consistent with our findings, Malmendier and Tate (2008) and Yim (2013) conclude that 
acquisition activities increase with a CEO’s tenure and that CARs decrease for long-tenured 
CEOs. Moreover, the results indicate that long-tenured CEOs are likely to suffer from 
increased overconfidence. During his/ her years as CEO, he/ she might attribute good 
performance to his/ her own abilities and built up an illusion of control (Doukas and 
Petmezas, 2007; Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Shefrin, 2005). Therefore, a positive impact of 
experience and knowledge, as suggested by Fung, Jo and Tsai (2009), must be rejected. 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) further support this argumentation by showing a strong 
correlation between CEO tenure and their measure of overconfidence. Since CEOs do not 
undertake acquisitions as frequently as other business activities, they are unlikely to learn 
from past mistakes (Roll, 1986). 
The negative coefficient of CEOTenure is also considered to be a proxy for CEO power and 
entrenchment (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; cited in Yim, 2013:261). The increasing power 
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over a CEO’s tenure can arise from detailed knowledge about the company or from emerging 
organisational power. As in our sample all CEOs serve as executive directors, they have a 
certain degree of organisational power and control over other directors. In particular executive 
directors are dependent on a good working relationship with the CEO, for instance to improve 
their career prospects in the company. Hence, CEOs increase their influence on the board of 
directors and their authority towards other individual directors over their tenure (Tricker, 
2012). 
Taking a closer look at the sub-sample regressions, one can observe a change of the 
coefficient’s sign from positive to negative. Hence, the shareholder’s perception of tenure 
seems to have changed after the financial crisis. Whereas before the crisis, tenure might 
indeed be regarded as an indicator for experience (Fung, Jo and Tsai, 2009), it is now 
considered as a measure of power and overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Yim, 
2013). Focusing on S&P 1500 firms from 1992 to 2007, Yim (2013) supports this argument 
by finding a positive, but statistically insignificant, influence of CEO tenure on announcement 
returns.  
 
5.3. Tenure of the CEO within the Firm 
H3: The acquisition undertaken by a long-firm-tenured CEO has a stronger 
short-term M&A performance than the acquisition undertaken by a short-firm-
tenured CEO. 
Firm tenure as a sign of experience, commitment and knowledge enhancement can neither be 
confirmed nor rejected by our regression results. The slightly positive coefficient of 
FirmTenure in nearly every regression setting is in line with our hypothesis but the coefficient 
is always statistically insignificant. Due to the fact that the null hypothesis of no explanatory 
power of the variable FirmTenure cannot be rejected, we can conclude that shareholders do 
not negatively perceive a long overall work-experience for a firm, compared to CEOTenure. 
A reason for this might be that managers, who have already joined the firm before becoming 
CEO, are not having crucial power over the board during their time as non-CEO (Tricker, 
2012). Moreover, the CEO might gain specific knowledge about the company and the 
industry during his/ her time in the company, which can be valuable for his/ her role as a CEO 
(Hillmann, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000).  
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5.4. CEO holding external Board Directorships 
H4: The acquisition undertaken by a CEO holding a board position within 
another company has a stronger short-term M&A performance than the 
acquisition undertaken by a CEO without holding an outside directorship.  
The negative but statistically insignificant coefficient of the variable BoardOutside does not 
support the hypothesis that CEOs holding outside directorships apply their independent 
judgments (Tricker, 2012) and objectivity (Byrd and Hickman, 1992) to their own board to 
pursue only value-creating M&As. A possible explanation for the insignificance of this 
variable is that we do not distinguish between independent and affiliated non-executive 
directors. A truly objective judgment is assumed to be only possible if the director has no 
other relation with the company except for his directorship (Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach 
2010; Tricker, 2012). Therefore, we cannot draw any implications from this variable for the 
effectiveness of the British corporate governance system. 
There are several reasons why BoardOutside negatively influences CAR3Day. First, holding a 
board position can be seen as a sign of status due to financial and nonfinancial benefits 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2005). Second, based on the theory that directors who are or have been 
executives of other companies are more solidary with the CEO (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005), 
one can develop the argument that CEOs holding an external directorship do increase the 
feeling of collegiality and solidarity within their company’s board. Consequently, the CEO is 
able to have more bargaining power over the board and the directors are less likely to disagree 
with the CEO’s actions (Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach 2010; Tricker, 2012). Third, CEOs 
serving on other boards are busier than CEOs without other board positions and might focus 
less on their core obligations as CEO (Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach 2010). 
Nevertheless, according to Lucey, Plaksina and Dowling (2013), higher social status should 
lead to a more risk-averse behaviour of the CEO and less acquisitiveness, contradicting our 
previous argumentation. Besides, Byrd and Hickman (1992) emphasise that CEOs having 
multiple directorships have higher incentives to reject non-value creating M&As to protect 
their good reputation. Moreover, CEOs might be only nominated into boards of other 
companies if he/ she performs well in his/ her job as CEO (Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach 
2010). 
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Looking at the period sub-samples, the influence of the variable BoardOutside changes with 
the financial crisis. We assume that this shift is due to an enhancement of investors’ scrutiny 
concerning the investment decision-making of CEOs (Hoffmann, Post and Pennings, 2011; 
KPMG, 2010). 
 
5.5. CEO having previous CEO Experience 
H5: The acquisition undertaken by a CEO having CEO experience in previous 
companies has a weaker short-term M&A performance than the acquisition 
undertaken by a CEO without previous CEO experience. 
Due to the fact that the coefficient of Experience is statistically insignificant in all regressions, 
the fifth hypothesis, suggesting a negative effect of previous CEO experience on CARs, 
cannot be confirmed. 
Elsaid, Wang and Davidson III (2011) state that stock markets react positively to the hiring of 
an outside CEO with previous CEO experience. However, firms that hire ex-CEOs show 
worse financial performances than firms hiring CEOs without CEO experience. Additionally, 
their study finds that ex-CEOs do not improve the performance of the company. Since CEOs 
without previous CEO experience sustain the good performance of their companies, they are 
more likely to pursue value-creating acquisitions. Thus, these arguments can give an 
explanation for the negative coefficient in the full-sample regression. Besides, ex-CEOs can 
be assumed to be more prone to overconfidence. Suffering from the self-attribution bias, they 
take credit for positive developments and blame others for negative outcomes during their 
CEO tenure at previous companies (Shefrin, 2005).  
 
5.6. CEO’s Educational Background 
H6a: The acquisition undertaken by a CEO having a business and technical 
education background has a weaker short-term M&A performance than the 
acquisition undertaken by a CEO who has education in only one study field. 
H6b: The acquisition undertaken by a CEO having a business education is 
assumed to have a weaker short-term M&A performance than the acquisition 
undertaken by a CEO with a technical background. 
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In line with our sixth hypothesis, our regression results indicate that being educated in the two 
study areas of business and engineering has a negative influence on CAR3Day. Using a 
CEO’s education in business and engineering as a potential source of self-attribution bias and 
overconfidence, we can confirm that the market is aware that the CEOs’ actions are more 
likely to be driven by overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). 
As Betrand and Schoar (2003) find that CEOs holding an MBA degree demonstrate more 
aggressive behaviour, we conclude that CEOs having a double-degree might be even more 
ambitious and strive for recognition and good reputation. Hence, those CEOs might also be 
perceived as being more likely to engage in empire-building. In contrast, Lucey, Plaksina and 
Dowling (2013) argue that education is a determinant of social status and that CEOs with high 
ascribed and achieved social status are less likely to engage in acquisitions due to their fear of 
losing the status. However, Lucey, Plaksina and Dowling (2013) focus in their study on the 
reputation of the university where the CEO gained his/ her degree as well as on awards that 
the CEO achieved rather than the depth and breadth of his/ her educational background. 
Despite the statistically significant results, the findings for EducationBT have to be treated 
with caution. Due to the fact that Age and EducationBT are negatively correlated it is 
presumed that younger CEOs are more likely to have a double-degree. In our sample, 62% of 
CEOs having two degrees are 53 years old or younger. Thus, the negative influence on CARs 
might be more driven by characteristics of young CEOs, such as dominant and risk-taking 
behaviour (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Serfling, 2014), rather than by his/ her educational 
background. 
The variables BusinessOnly and TechnicalOnly also have a negative influence on stock 
returns even though the coefficients are not statistically significant. Only for the sub-period 
2004 to 2007, BusinessOnly is statistically significant and has a negative coefficient value. 
The negative influence of business education is consistent with Malmendier and Tate’s (2008) 
finding that finance education21 increases a CEO’s acquisitiveness and is slightly correlated to 
their measure of overconfidence. Due to the fact that the well-performance of companies is 
driven by a CEO’s management ability and skills rather than his/ her firm-specific knowledge, 
technical education has a negative influence on short-term M&A performance (Elsaid, Wang 
and Davidson III, 2011; Kaplan, Klebanov and Sorensen, 2012). However, a positive 
                                                
21 Financial and business education are identically defined.  
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influence of business education on performance seems not to hold for acquisition 
announcements, as demonstrated in our research sample. 
5.7. CEO undertaking three or more Acquisitions 
H7: The acquisition undertaken by a CEO representing at least his/ her third 
acquisition in the sample period has a weaker short-term M&A performance 
than the first or second acquisition undertaken by this CEO. 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) emphasise that overconfidence increases the frequency of 
M&As and lowers the quality and the value-creating potential of acquisitions. Consistent with 
this statement, we find that the market reacts negatively if a CEO pursues three or more 
acquisitions confirming our seventh hypothesis. Thereby, we loosen the overconfidence proxy 
of Doukas and Petmezas (2007) by extending the time period from three to ten years and 
reducing the number of acquisitions from five to three. Contradicting our results, a study of 
KPMG (2010) concludes that acquirers with previous M&A experience show better 
performance. KPMG’s findings indicate that the negative market response to high 
acquisitiveness is only apparent for six or more acquisitions and companies that pursue three 
to five deals are the most successful. 
Taking a different point of view, one can also argue that rational CEOs become more 
aggressive from deal to deal leading to a decline of CARs. Rational CEOs learn from previous 
successful acquisitions and are willing to pay a higher premium. In contrast, overconfident 
CEOs learn from the negative market response to their past acquisitions, and they may 
become more cautious and as a result, the CARs increase (Aktas, de Bodt and Roll, 2006). 
With these findings, Roll reverse his previous argumentation (1986) where he underlines that 
M&As are too rare to allow acquiring CEOs to learn from their past mistakes. However, the 
pace of learning for overconfident CEOs and the reduction of their frequent acquisition 
activities are found to be slow (Aktas, de Bodt and Roll, 2006). Therefore, overconfident 
CEOs can still cause the negative coefficient of our variable ThreeOrMore. Generally, Aktas, 
de Bodt and Roll (2006) as well as Conn et al. (2004) confirm the overall declining trend of 
CARs with an increasing number of deals. A distinction whether the negative influence of 
high acquisitiveness stems mainly from rational CEOs becoming aggressive (Aktas, de Bodt 
and Roll, 2006) or mainly from overconfident CEOs (Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2008) requires further research. It should account for a valid measure 
of overconfidence and the absolute number of deals. 
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Our result of the significant impact of variable ThreeOrMore cannot only be interpreted based 
on the overconfidence theory but also on the agency theory. The negative influence of 
numerous acquisitions can also be assumed to be an indicator of empire-building motivations 
of the CEO (Byrd and Hickman, 1992). To confirm both theories with certainty, further 
research with regard to free cash flow has to be undertaken since abundant internal resources 
give incentives for empire-building (Jensen, 1986) and they lead to more acquisitions 
undertaken by overconfident CEOs (Malmendier and Tate, 2008).  
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6. Conclusion 
The final chapter summarises the result that certain CEO characteristics have a crucial 
influence on short-term M&A performance. In doing so, we draw implications from our 
findings for the board of directors. At last, suggestions for further research are considered. 
6.1. Implications for Corporate Governance 
As outlined in the review of the theoretical background, acquiring firms having a poor 
corporate governance system experience lower abnormal returns compared to the ones with a 
good corporate governance system. The UK is assumed to have one of the best corporate 
governance systems being associated with a high level of operational and financial 
transparency as well as accountability towards shareholders and the public. Consequently, the 
internal governance system is expected to discipline CEOs in their execution of M&As and to 
support the accomplishment of only shareholder value-creating deals.  
Coming back to the conceptual framework introduced at the beginning, we proof in this 
research study on a sample of 56 FTSE companies that CEO characteristics have a substantial 
influence on short-term CARs around the acquisition announcements. Precisely, we find that 
acquisitions undertaken by young CEOs have significantly weaker short-term performances 
than acquisitions undertaken by older CEOs. In contrast, acquisitions undertaken by long-
tenured CEOs are negatively perceived by the stock market whereas the overall tenure of a 
CEO in a company has a positive, but statistically insignificant, effect. On average, a CEO 
holding an outside directorship, having previous CEO experience as well as being awarded 
with a double degree undertakes poorer acquisitions. Statistical significance can only be 
found for the influence of education. At last, the variable ThreeOrMore, as a proxy for high 
acquisitiveness, indicates that high order deals cause lower deal quality, revealed in lower 
abnormal stock returns around their announcement. 
The observed CARs for our sample of 164 acquisitions confirm that, on average, M&As fail 
to achieve the goal of shareholder wealth maximisation. Therefore, we infer that corporate 
governance does not interfere enough to reduce the realisation of value-destroying 
acquisitions by CEOs. The results can be interpreted on the one side by the theory of agency 
costs, especially empire-building, and on the other side by the theory of hubris and 
overconfidence.  
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Based on the fact that the British governance system highly focuses on shareholder protection 
and reduction of agency costs, we conclude that the influence of overconfidence on M&A 
performance is superior, compared to imperfectly aligned contracts. The elimination of CEO 
duality, the requirement of independent board members and the separation of responsibilities 
throughout the board committees in the UK are all factors reducing a CEO’s overall power 
and increasing the likelihood of well-aligned incentive contracts. Under the assumption of 
perfectly aligned incentives, our findings confirm that overconfident CEOs are likely to 
unintendedly undertake non value-creating acquisitions. 
Therefore, we recommend that the board of directors improves its monitoring abilities to 
detect and counteract acquisitions driven by overconfident CEOs. Moreover, the advisory role 
of the board gains in importance due to our findings. The board should assist the CEO to 
undertake an objective and independent judgement of the value-creation of a potential 
acquisition. In addition to the board, our results also have implications for individual and 
institutional investors. As the board is responsible to represent shareholders’ interests, the 
investors should be vigilant about the board’s awareness of overconfidence in corporate 
decision-making. 
Taking a closer look at the impact of the financial crisis of 2007/2008, we can identify that the 
influence of the CEO characteristics CEO tenure, CEO experience and outside directorship on 
M&A performance shifts from positive to negative. Thus, we concluded that the macro-
financial crisis has caused a change in investor’s perception. We assume that the market has 
increased its awareness and its ability to detect the influence of overconfidence on corporate 
decisions-making. 
 
6.2. Further Research 
Despite our reasoned findings, our study bears the weakness that we cannot certainly identify 
whether the influence of the considered variables is caused by empire-building motivations or 
by overconfidence. Therefore, further studies have to apply a valid and well-defined proxy for 
overconfidence to extract the overconfidence effect from the consequences of imperfectly 
aligned incentives. Moreover, the influence of the financial crisis on the effect of CEO 
characteristics on short-term M&A performance is not statistically significant. Consequently, 
we recommend the application of a broader acquisition sample and sub-samples should 
specifically cover the periods ‘before’, 'during’ and ‘after’ the crisis. Additionally, the 
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application of another statistical regression model such as the logistic model can provide 
evidence whether the effect of several CEO characteristics on the likelihood of acquisitions 
has changed due to the financial crisis. 
Besides, further research is recommended to be conducted with regards to specific corporate 
governance variables such as board size and board composition. The findings may display to 
which extent an independent board can determine the CEO’s influence on M&A performance 
and if it can improve the average performance. A broader global acquisition sample enables 
the researcher to compare the effectiveness of different corporate governance systems. 
Furthermore, a global sample allows the verification of the influence of additional CEO 
characteristics on short-term M&A performance. For instance, determining the effect of a 
CEO’s gender on acquisition activities is currently a vital topic and can contribute to the on-
going discussion of women’s performance in executive positions. 
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Company Industry 
Market 
Cap 
(millions 
GBP)
1% of 
Market 
cap
Announcement 
date
Form of 
Transaction
Target Industry
Deal Size 
(millions 
USD)
Exchange 
rate
Deal Size 
(millions 
GBP)
Aggreko PLC Professional Services
Market cap as of Dec 2011       5,881   59 26.03.12 Merger Cia Brasileira de Locacoes Professional Services        255    0.6262         160   
Market cap as of Dec 2005          852   9 26.09.06 Acquisition of 
Assets
GE Energy Rentals Inc Other Consumer Products        212    0.5873         124   
Anglo American PLC Metals & Mining
Market cap as of Dec 2007     41,643   416 17.01.08 Acquisition of 
Majority Assets
IronX Mineracao SA Metals & Mining     3,493    0.5079      1,774   
ARM Holdings PLC Semiconductors
Market cap as of Dec 2003       1,216   12 23.08.04 Merger Artisan Components Inc Semiconductors        816    0.5533         451   
Ashtead Group PLC Other Consumer Products
Market cap as of Apr 2013       3,504   35 13.05.13 Acquisitions of 
Assets
Accession Group Ltd Other Consumer Products          54    0.6537           35   
Associated British Foods PLC Food & Beverage
Market cap as of Sep 2005       6,421   64 19.05.06 Acquisitions of 
Majority Assets
Illovo Sugar Ltd Food & Beverage        632    0.5327         337   
Market cap as of Sep 2004       5,661   57 11.07.05 Acquisition of 
Assets
Littlewoods Ltd
Discount & Department 
Store Retailing
       717    0.5689         408   
Market cap as of Sep 2003       4,418   44 22.07.04
Acquisitions of 
Assets
Burns Philp& Co Ltd- 
International Yeast & Bakery 
Ingredients
Food & Beverage     1,350    0.5422         732   
AstraZeneca PLC Pharmaceuticals
Market cap as of Dec 2012     40,646   406 10.06.13 Merger Pearl Therapeutics Inc Biotechnology     1,150   0.6422         738   
Market cap as of Dec 2011     35,683   357 23.04.12 Merger Ardea Biosciences Inc Biotechnology     1,033    0.6201         641   
Market cap as of Dec 2006     43,056   431 23.04.07 Merger Medimmune Inc Biotechnology   14,681    0.5000      7,341   
Babcock International Group 
PLC
Building/ Construction
Market cap as of Mar 2009       1,075   11 15.02.10 Merger VT Group PLC Automobiles & 
Components
    2,184    0.6386      1,395   
Market cap as of Mar 2009       1,075   11 18.09.09 Acquisition of 
Assets
UKEA Ltd Water and Waste Mgmt          81    0.6146           50   
Market cap as of Mar 2008       1,421   14 21.04.08 Acquisition of 
Assets
Weir Strachan & Henshaw 
LTD
Building/ Construction        129    0.5051           65   
Market cap as of Mar 2007       1,132   11 10.05.07 Acquisition of 
Assets
Devonport Management Ltd
Automobiles & 
Components
       694    0.5050         351   
Market cap as of Mar 2007       1,132   11 04.04.07 Merger International Nuclear Solutions 
PLC
Building/ Construction          39    0.5059           20   
Market cap as of Mar 2006          641   6 13.06.06
Acquisition of 
Assets
ABB South Africa- High 
Voltage Powerlines & Mobile 
Telecomes Unit
Other Energy & Power            8    0.5454             4   
Market cap as of Mar 2006          641   6 09.05.06 Acquisition of 
Assets
Alstec Group Ltd Professional Services          83    0.5355           44   
Market cap as of Mar 2004          159   2 10.09.04 Acquisition of 
Assets
Turners & Partners Technical 
Services Ltd
Professional Services          21    0.5562           12   
Market cap as of Mar 2003          150   2 19.03.04 Merger Peterhouse Group PLC Building/ Construction        261    0.5457         142   
BAE Systems PLC Aerospace & Defense
Market cap as of Dec 2009     12,348   123 22.12.10 Acquisition of 
Assets
ETI A/S Legal Services        211    0.6499         137   
Market cap as of Dec 2009     12,348   123 18.05.10 Acquisition of 
Assets
Atlantic Marine Holding Co
Automobiles & 
Components
       352    0.6992         246   
Market cap as of Dec 2003       5,633   56 03.06.04 Merger Alvis PLC Aerospace & Defense        264    0.5434         143   
BG Group PLC Oil Gas
Market cap as of Dec 2005     25,234   252 28.12.06 Acquisition of 
Assets
Lake Road Power Plant Power        685    0.5094         349   
Market cap as of Dec 2003      11,965   120 16.02.04 Acquisition of 
Assets
El Paso Oil & Gas Canada Oil & Gas        346   0.5289         183   
BHP Billiton PLC Metals & Mining
Market cap as of Jun 2011   104,651   1047 14.07.11 Merger Petrohawk Enegery Corp Oil & Das   15,557    0.6193      9,635   
BP PLC
Market cap as of Dec 2009    114,874   1149 11.03.10 Acquisition of 
Assets
Devon Energy Corp. Oil Assets Oil & Gas     7,000    0.6639      4,647   
British American  Tobacco PLC Tobacco
Market cap as of Dec 2008     31,972   320 17.06.09 Acquisition of 
Majority Assets
Bentoel Internasional 
Investama Tbk PT
Tobacco        645    0.6100         393   
British Sky Broadcasting Group 
PLC
Cable
Market cap as of Jun 2012     12,309   123 01.03.13
Acquisition of 
Assets
Telefonica UK Ltd - O2 
Broadband a& BE Telephony 
Business
Wireless        301    0.6653         200   
Market cap as of Jun 2009       9,493   95 04.06.10 Acquisition of 
Assets
Virgin Media Television Broadcasting        231    0.6914         160   
BT Group PLC Telecommunication 
Services
Market cap as of Mar 2004     15,410   154 08.11.04 Merger Infonet Services Corp Software        574    0.5388         309   
Bunzl PLC Professional Services
Market cap as of Dec 2003       2,013   20 10.05.04 Acquisition of 
Assets
PLG Finances SA Chemicals        391    0.5628         220   
Appendix A: Valid M&A deals
Company Industry 
Market 
Cap 
(millions 
GBP)
1% of 
Market 
cap
Announcement 
date
Form of 
Transaction
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Deal Size 
(millions 
USD)
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Deal Size 
(millions 
GBP)
Burberry Group PLC Textiles & Apparels
Market cap as of Mar 2010       3,465   35 16.07.10 Acquisition of 
Assets
Kwok Hang Holdings Ltd- 
China Stores (50)
Apparel Retailing        106    0.654           69   
Capita PLC Professional Services
Market cap as of Dec 2012       5,528   55 23.10.13 Acquisition of 
Assets
ParkingEye Ltd IT Consulting & Services          95    0.6186           59   
Market cap as of Dec 2012       5,528   55 14.02.13 Acquisition of 
Assets
Northgate Managed Services 
Ltd
IT Consulting & Services        101    0.6456           65   
Market cap as of Dec 2010       4,441   44 23.12.11 Acquisition of 
Assets
Applied Language Solutions 
Ltd
Professional Services        105    0.6411           67   
Market cap as of Dec 2010       4,441   44 01.07.11 Acquisition of 
Assets
Club 24 Ltd
Telecommunication 
Services
       104    0.6220           65   
Market cap as of Dec 2009       4,871   49 01.06.10 Merger Premier Medical Group Ltd Professional Services          88    0.6827           60   
Market cap as of Dec 2008       4,091   41 21.12.09 Acquisition of 
Assets
Synetrix (Holdings) IT Consulting & Services        120    0.6230           75   
Market cap as of Dec 2007       4,096   41 05.06.08 Merger IBS OPENSystems PLC Software        128    0.5107           65   
Centrica PLC Power
Market cap as of Dec 2010     17,174   172 21.11.11 Acquisitions of 
Assets
Statoil ASA- Norwegian 
Continental Shelf Assets (8)
Oil & Gas     1,624    0.6392      1,038   
Market cap as of Dec 2006     14,156   142 17.09.07 Merger Newfield UK Holdings Ltd Oil & Gas        483    0.5013         242   
Market cap as of Dec 2004       9,084   91 01.07.05 Acquisitions of 
Assets
Oxxio Nederland BV Power        168    0.5659           95   
Market cap as of Dec 2003       8,723   87 08.06.04 Acquisitions of 
Assets
Killingholme Power Ltd- 
Power Station
Power        261    0.5446         142   
Diageo PLC Food & Beverage
Market cap as of Jun 2010 26,986    270 21.02.11 Acquisition of 
Assets
Mey Icki Sanyive Ticaret AS Food & Beverage     2,095   0.6247      1,309   
easyJet plc Transportation & 
Infrastructure
Market cap as of Sep 2007 2,036      20 25.10.07 Merger GB Airways Ltd Transportation & 
Infrastructure
       212   0.4875         103   
Experian PLC
Professional Services 
(earlier Computers & 
Peripherals)
Market cap as of Mar 2013 12,055    121 06.11.13 Acquisition of 
Assets
Passport Health 
Communications Inc
IT Consulting & Services        850   0.6218         529   
Market cap as of Mar 2011 7,510      75 28.06.11 Acquisition of 
Assets
Medical Present Value Inc Software        185   0.6250         116   
Market cap as of Mar 2011 7,510      75 03.05.11 Acquisition of 
Majority Assets
Comptec SA Computer & Peripherals        382   0.6067         232   
Market cap as of Mar 2010 6,300      63 21.09.10 Acquisition of 
Assets
Mighty Net Inc Computer & Peripherals        208   0.6406         133   
Market cap as of Mar 2008 4,030      40 10.12.08 Acquisition of 
Assets
Search America Software          90   0.6761           61   
G4S PLC Professional Services
Market cap as of Dec 2007 2,940      29 04.06.08 Acquisition of 
Assets
Touchcom Inc Professional Services          56   0.5116           29   
Market cap as of Dec 2006 2,665      27 18.12.07 Merger Global Solutions Ltd (GSL) Professional Services        718   0.4966         357   
GKN PLC Automotive/ Aerospace
Market cap as of Dec 2011 3,451      35 05.07.12 Acquisition of 
Assets
Volvo Aero AB Aerospace & Defense        983   0.6441         633   
Market cap as of Dec 2010 3,260      33 28.07.11 Acquisition of 
Assets
Gertrag Corp
Automobiles & 
Components
       483   0.6106         295   
Market cap as of Dec 2010 3,260      33 18.07.11 Merger Stromag Holding GmbH Automobiles & 
Components
       275   0.6229         171   
Market cap as of Dec 2007 2,120      21 15.09.08
Acquisition of 
Assets
Airbus SAS-Wing Component 
& Sub-Assembly 
Manufacturing Site
Aerospace & Defense        245   0.5556         136   
Market cap as of Dec 2005 2,410      24 03.08.06 Acquisition of 
Assets
Rockford Powertrain Inc. Electronics          50   0.5298           26   
Market cap as of Dec 2003 2,013      20 04.08.04 Merger Velcon SA de CV Automobiles & 
Components
         83   0.5477           45   
GlaxoSmithKline PLC Pharmaceuticals
Market cap as of Dec 2011 70,678    707 19.04.12 Merger Human Genome Sciences Inc Biotechnology     3,269   0.6228      2,036   
Market cap as of Dec 2008 53,181    532 20.04.09 Merger Stiefel Laboratories Inc Pharmaceuticals     3,600   0.6884      2,478   
Market cap as of Dec 2006 79,390    794 21.11.07 Acquisitions of 
Assets
Reliant Pharmaceuticals Inc Pharmaceuticals     1,650   0.4843         799   
Market cap as of Dec 2004 72,247    722 07.09.05 Merger ID Biomedical Corp Biotechnology     1,388   0.5444         756   
IMI PLC Machinery
Market cap as of Dec 2012 3,915      39 22.08.13 Acquisition of 
Assets
Analytical Flow Products Other Industrial          64   0.6415           41   
Market cap as of Dec 2009 1,834      18 25.10.10 Acquisition of 
Assets
Z&J Technologies GmbH Other Industrial        189   0.6356         120   
Market cap as of Dec 2005 1,989      20 06.03.06 Acquisition of 
Assets
Truflo Ltd Machinery        211   0.5715         121   
Market cap as of Dec 2004 1,445      14 03.10.05 Acquisition of 
Assets
ABB KK-Control Valves 
Business
Other Energy & Power          35   0.5698           20   
Market cap as of Dec 2004 1,445      14 09.02.05 Acquisition of 
Assets
Syron Engineering & 
Manufacturing LLC
Professional Services          33   0.5380           18   
Imperial Tobacco Group PLC Tobacco
Market cap as of Sep 2006 13,682    137 08.02.07 Merger Commonwealth Brands Inc Tobacco     1,900   0.5107         970   
Market cap as of Sep 2005 12,401    124 30.08.06 Acquisition of 
Assets
Tchibo Holding AG- Davidoff 
cigarette global brand rights
Tobacco        693   0.5250         364   
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Intertek Group PLC Professional Services
Market cap as of Dec 2012 5,457      55 19.11.13 Acquisition of 
Assets
Architectural Testing Inc Building/ Construction          95   0.6203           59   
Market cap as of Dec 2010 3,030      30 07.03.11 Acquisition of 
Assets
Moody International Ltd Professional Services        730   0.6172         451   
Market cap as of Dec 2007 1,466      15 30.09.08 Merger HP White Laboratory Inc Professional Services          43   0.5609           24   
Market cap as of Dec 2007 1,466      15 09.04.08 Acquisition of 
Assets
Hi-Cad technical Services Ltd Software          33   0.5062           17   
Market cap as of Dec 2003 746         7 10.05.04 Merger Entela Inc. Professional Services          24   0.5628           14   
itv plc Broadcasting
Market cap as of Dec 2004 4,811      48 06.12.05 Acquisition of 
Assets
Friends Reunited Internet Software        305   0.5742         175   
Market cap as of Dec 2004 4,811      48 27.04.05 Acquisition of 
Assets
SDN Ltd Broadcasting        285   0.5249         150   
J Sainsbury PLC Food & Beverage Retailing
Market cap as of Mar 2008 5,514      55 04.03.09 Acquisitions of 
Assets
Co-operative Group Ltd- 
Stores (24)
Food & Beverage 
Retailing
       181   0.7062         128   
Johnson Matthey PLC Chemicals
Market cap as of Mar 2012 4,760      48 28.03.13 Acquisition of 
Assets
Formox AB Chemicals        161   0.6581         106   
Market cap as of Mar 2012 4,760      48 23.10.12 Merger Axeon Holdings PLC Automobiles & 
Components
         65   0.6305           41   
Market cap as of Mar 2010 3,292      33 06.10.10 Acquisition of 
Assets
Intercat Inc Chemicals          56   0.6291           35   
Market cap as of Mar 2007 3,806      38 10.12.07 Acquisition of 
Assets
Argillon GmbH Electronics        315   0.4885         154   
Market cap as of Mar 2005 2,149      21 01.02.06 Acquisition of 
Assets
Davy Process Technology Ltd Chemicals          71   0.5636           40   
Market cap as of Mar 2003 1,974      20 31.03.04 Acquisition of 
Assets
AMC Group of Cos Pharmaceuticals          43   0.5417           23   
Marks and Spencer Group PLC Discount & Department 
Store Retailing
Market cap as of Mar 2004 6,337      63 12.07.04 Acquisition of 
Assets
Per Una Apparel Retailing        233   0.5371         125   
Meggitt PLC Aerospace & Defense
Market cap as of Dec 2010 2,594      26 18.01.11 Acquisition of 
Assets
Pacific Scientific Aaerospace Machinery        685   0.6266         429   
Market cap as of Dec 2006 1,302      13 06.03.07 Merger K&F Industries Holdings Inc Aerospace & Defense     1,807   0.5177         936   
Meggitt PLC Market cap as of Dec 2005 1,447      14 13.09.06 Acquisition of 
Assets
Keith Products LP Machinery          32   0.5328           17   
Market cap as of Dec 2003 791         8 05.07.04
Acquisition of 
Assets
Dunlop Standard Aerospace 
Group-Design and 
Manufacturing Businesses
Aerospace & Defense        748   0.5464         409   
Mondi PLC Paper & Forest Products
2,838      28 14.09.12
Acquisition of 
Assets
Duropack GmbH- Corrugated 
Box & Containerboard 
Operations
Containers & Packaging        164   0.6167         101   
National Grid PLC Power
Market cap as of Mar 2005 14,068    141 27.02.06 Merger KeySpan Corp Oil & Gas   11,872   0.5748      6,825   
Market cap as of Mar 2004 11,686    117 25.06.04 Acquisition of 
Assets
Crown Castle UK Ltd Wireless     2,035   0.5474      1,114   
Pearson PLC Publishing
Market cap as of Dec 2011 9,728      97 16.10.12 Acquisition of 
Assets
Embanet- Compass 
Knowledge Group
Other Consumer Products        650    0.6202         403   
Market cap as of Dec 2019 8,637      86 21.11.11 Acquisition of 
Assets
Global Education & 
Technology Group Ltd
Educational Services        162   0.6392         104   
Market cap as of Dec 2010 8,637      86 26.04.11 Acquisition of 
Assets
SchoolNet Inc Internet Software        230   0.6067         140   
Market cap as of Dec 2010 8,637      86 07.03.11 Merger Education Development 
International PLC
Educational Services        166   0.6172         102   
Market cap as of Dec 2009 8,297      83 22.07.10
Acquisition of 
Assets
Sistema Educational Brasileiro 
SA- School Learning Systems 
Business
Educational Services        499   0.6555         327   
Market cap as of Dec 2009 8,297      83 19.05.10 Acquisition of 
Majority Assets
Melorio PLC Professiona Services        156   0.6918         108   
Market cap as of Dec 2008 5,224      52 15.04.09 Merger Wall Street English Educational Services        145   0.6450           94   
Market cap as of Dec 2006 6,925      69 04.05.07
Acquisition of 
Assets
Reed Elsevier Group PLC- 
Harcourt Education
Educational Services        952    0.5020         478   
Market cap as of Dec 2005 6,263      63 08.08.06 Acquisition of 
Assets
Mergermarket Computers & Peripherals        192    0.5242         101   
Persimmon PLC Building/ Constructions
Market cap as of Dec 2011 1,996      20 08.10.12 Merger Hiireed Homes Ltd Other Real Estate          57   0.6241           36   
Market cap as of Dec 2004 2,272      23 14.12.05 Merger Senator Homes Ltd Other Real Estate          44   0.5641           25   
Market cap as of Dec 2004 2,272      23 14.11.05 Merger Westbury PLC Building/ Construction     1,571    0.5752         904   
Petrofac Ltd. Oil & Gas
Market cap as of Dec 2007 2,158      22 29.08.08 Acquisition of 
Assets
Caltec Ltd Oil & Gas          55   0.5490           30   
Market cap as of Dec 2007 2,158      22 25.07.08 Acquisition of 
Assets
Eclipse Petroleum Technology 
Ltd
Building/ Construction          46   0.5023           23   
Randgold Resources Ltd. Metals & Mining
Market cap as of Dec 2008 2,358      24 16.07.09 Merger Moto Goldmines Ltd Metals & Mining        523   0.6081         318   
Reckitt Benckiser Group PLC. Households & Personal 
Products
Market cap as of Dec 2011 25,787    258 15.11.12 Merger Schiff Nutrition International 
Inc
Pharmaceuticals     1,434   0.6305         904   
Market cap as of Dec 2009 25,175    252 13.12.10 Merger Paras Pharmaceuticals Ltd Pharmaceuticals        722   0.6308         455   
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Reckitt Benckiser Group PLC. Market cap as of Dec 2009 25,175    252 21.07.10 Merger SSL Internatonal PLC Healthcare Equipment     3,872   0.6549      2,536   
Market cap as of Dec 2006 18,982    190 10.12.07 Merger Adams Respiratory 
Therapeutics Inc
Pharmaceuticals     2,234    0.4885      1,091   
Market cap as of Dec 2004 12,064    121 07.10.05 Acquisitions of 
Assets
Boots Healthcare International Pharmaceuticals     3,427    0.5678      1,946   
Reed Elsevier PLC Publishing
Market cap as of Dec 2010 6,588      66 26.09.11 Merger Accuity Inc Computers & Peripherals        531   0.6428         341   
Market cap as of Dec 2007 6,830      68 21.02.08 Merger ChoicePoint Inc IT Consulting & Services     4,380    0.5093      2,231   
Market cap as of Dec 2004 6,738      67 26.05.05 Acquisition of 
Assets
MediMedia MAP Publishing        340    0.5494         187   
Rexam PLC Containers & Packaging
Market cap as of Dec 2006 3,182      32 04.07.07 Acquisition of 
Assets
Rostar Containers & Packaging        297   0.4959         147   
Market cap as of Dec 2006 3,182      32 08.06.07 Merger Ol Plastic Products FTS Inc Containers & Packaging     1,825   0.5075         926   
Market cap as of Dec 2004 2,513      25 14.11.05 Merger Precise Technology Inc Chemicals        257   0.5752         148   
Market cap as of Dec 2004 2,513      25 06.09.05 Acquisition of 
Assets
Delta Plastics Containers & Packaging        154   0.5428           84   
Rio Tinto PLC Metals & Mining
Market cap as of Dec 2009 71,722    717 06.12.10 Merger Riversdale Mining Ltd Metals & Mining     3,661   0.6365      2,330   
SAB Miller PLC Consumer Products
Market cap as of Mar 2007 19,855    199 19.11.07 Merger Koninklijke Grolsch NV Food & Beverage     1,286   0.4879         628   
Market cap as of Mar 2005 11,378    114 19.07.05 Acquisition of 
Majority Assets
Bavaria SA Food & Beverage     5,227   0.5746      3,003   
Shire PLC Pharmaceuticals
Market cap as of Dec 2012 11,862    119 08.01.13 Merger Lotus Tissue Repar Inc Biotechnology        324   0.6228         202   
Market cap as of Dec 2011 12,292    123 15.03.12 Acquisition of 
Assets
Ferrokin Biosciences Inc Biotechnology        325   0.6365         207   
Market cap as of Dec 2010 9,395      94 17.05.11 Acquisition of 
Assets
Advanced Biohealing Inc Pharmaceuticals        750   0.6155         462   
Market cap as of Dec 2009 7,617      76 30.06.10 Acquisition of 
Assets
Lexington Technology Park Non Residential        165   0.6690         110   
Market cap as of Dec 2006 5,387      54 20.02.07 Merger New River Pharmaceuticals 
Inc
Pharmaceuticals     2,667   0.5114      1,364   
Market cap as of Dec 2004 2,975      30 21.04.05 Merger Transkaryotic Therapies Inc Biotechnology     1,347   0.5238         706   
Smith & Nephew PLC Healtcare Equipment
Market cap as of Dec 2011 5,649      56 28.11.12 Acquisition of 
Assets
Healthpoint Biotherapeutics 
Ltd
Biotechnology        782   0.6244         488   
Market cap as of Dec 2006 6,107      61 12.03.07 Acquisition of 
Assets
Plus Orthopedics AG Healthcare Equipment        881   0.5174         456   
Sports Direct International PLC Other Retailing
Market cap as of Apr 2009 536         5 07.08.09 Acquisition of 
Assets
JJB Sports PLC- Stores (20) Other Retailing          39   0.5994           23   
The Sage Group PLC Software
Market cap as of Sep 2005 3,422      34 09.01.06 Acquisition of 
Assets
Verus Financial Management 
Inc
Computers & Peripherals        325   0.5667         184   
Travis Perkins PLC Construction Materials
Market cap as of Dec 2009 1,513      15 28.05.10 Merger The BSS Group PLC Building/ Construction        924   0.6913         639   
Market cap as of Dec 2007 1,229      12 07.04.08 Merger Toolstation Ltd Building/ Construction          38   0.5030           19   
Market cap as of Dec 2003 1,508      15 16.12.04 Acquisition of 
Assets
Wickes Ltd
Home Improvement 
Retailing
    1,834   0.5178         950   
Tullow Oil PLC Oil & Gas
Market cap as of Dec 2011 13,159    132 11.12.12 Acquisition of 
Assets
Spring Energy Norway AS Oil & Gas        672   0.6207         417   
Market cap as of Dec 2010 12,958    130 24.05.11 Acquisition of 
Assets
Nuon Exporation & Production 
BV (Nuon E&P)
Oil & Gas        423   0.6179         261   
Market cap as of Dec 2005 2,731      27 25.09.06 Merger Hardmann Resources Ltd Oil & Gas     1,167   0.5262         614   
Market cap as of Dec 2003 367         4 20.12.04 Acquisition of 
Assets
Schooner, Ketch Natural Gas 
Fields
Oil & Gas        389   0.5139         200   
Market cap as of Dec 2003 367         4 26.03.04 Merger Energy Africa Ltd Oil & Gas        485   0.5507         267   
Unilever PLC Food & Beverage
Market cap as of Dec 2009 55,999    560 27.09.10 Merger Alberto-Culver Co Other Consumer Products     3,728   0.6317      2,355   
Market cap as of Dec 2008 35,310    353 25.09.09
Acquisition of 
Assets
Sara Lee Corp-European 
Household and Personal Care 
Business
Household & Personal 
Products
    1,873   0.6268      1,174   
Vodafone Group PLC Wireless
Market cap as of Mar 2008 82,552    826 09.02.09 Merger
Hutchison Telecommunication 
(Australia) Ltd-Telecommun 
Bus
Wireless     2,456   0.6708      1,648   
Market cap as of Mar 2005 87,811    878 13.12.05
Acquisitions of 
assets
TELSIM Mobil 
Telekomunikasyor Hizmetleri 
AS
Wireless     4,557   0.5651      2,575   
Market cap as of Mar 2005 87,811    878 04.11.05 Merger VenFin Ltd. Wireless     2,556   0.5712      1,460   
Market cap as of Mar 2004 86,813    868 15.03.05 Merger Oskar mobil as Telecommunications 
Services
    4,400   0.5230      2,301   
Weir Group PLC Machinery
Market cap as of Dec 2011 4,446      44 25.01.12 Acquisitions of 
assets
Novatech LLC Other industrials        176   0.6385         112   
Market cap as of Dec 2010 3,640      36 23.11.11 Acquisitions of 
assets
Seaboard Holdings Inc Oil & Gas        675   0.6445         435   
Market cap as of Dec 2009 2,039      20 14.06.10 Merger Linatex Consolidated Holdings 
Ltd.
Other industrials        202   0.6783         137   
Market cap as of Dec 2007 1,554      16 24.06.08 Acquisition of 
assets
Mesa Manufacturing Inc. Other industrials          40   0.5073           20   
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Weir Group PLC Market cap as of Dec 2006 1,276      13 04.12.07 Acquisition of 
assets
CH Warman Pump Group Machinery        231   0.4856         112   
Market cap as of Dec 2006 1,276      13 21.06.07 Merger SPM Flow Control Inc. Oil & Gas        653   0.5018         328   
Whitbread PLC Food & Beverage Retailing
Market cap as of Feb 2009 1,559      16 11.12.09 Merger coffeeheaven international 
PLC
Food & Beverage 
Retailing
         57   0.6153           35   
Market cap as of Feb 2007 3,744      37 26.09.07 Acquisition of 
assets
Golden Tulip (UK) Ltd. Hotels & Lodging          89   0.4959           44   
William Hill PLC Recreation & Leisure
Market cap as of Dec 2012 3,127      31 20.03.13 Acquisition of 
Assets
Sportingbet PLC- Australien 
Business
Casinos & Gaming        687   0.6622         455   
Market cap as of Dec 2010 1,339      13 14.04.11
Acquisition of 
Assets
Sierre Development Co-Club 
Cal Neva Sateliite Race & 
Sportsbook Div
Casinos & Gaming          22   0.6116           13   
Market cap as of Dec 2004 2,517      25 16.05.05
Acquisition of 
Assets
Stanley Leisure PLC- Retail 
Bookmarking European 
Operations
Casinos & Gaming        953   0.5441         519   
Wolseley PLC Building & Constructions
Market cap as of Jul 2006 7,400      74 02.10.06 Acqusisitions of 
Assets
Castle Group Building/ Construction        209   0.5299         111   
Market cap as of Jul 2005 7,011      70 24.07.06 Acqusisitions of 
Assets
DT Groups A/S
Home Improvement 
Retailing
    2,536   0.5401      1,370   
Market cap as of Jul 2005 7,011      70 31.10.05 Acqusisitions of 
Assets
William Wilson Holdings Ltd Building/ Construction        143   0.5649           81   
Market cap as of Jul 2003 4,208      42 30.07.04 Acqusisitions of 
Assets
Brooks Group Ltd Construction Materials        256   0.5494         141   
WPP PLC Advertising & Marketing
Market cap as of Dec 2007 7,160      72 29.09.08 Exchange Offer WPP Group PLC Advertising & Marketing   12,380   0.5531      6,848   
Market cap as of Dec 2006 9,286      93 17.05.07 Merger 24/7 Real Media Inc. Internet Software        600   0.4915         295   
Market cap as of Dec 2005 6,543      65 13.09.04 Merger Grey Global Group Inc. Advertising & Marketing     1,238   0.5564         689   
Company Industry Reason
Aberdeen Asset Mgmt. Fund Management Financial Institution
Admiral Group PLC Insurance Financial Institution
Antofagasta PLC Metals & Mining No valid M&As in defined sample period according to specified 
criteria (acquisition through subsidiary)
Avivia PLC Insurance Financial Institution
Barclays PLC Banking Financial Institution
Barratt Developments PLC Property Propery Development and Investment Firm
British Land Company PLC Property Propery Development and Investment Firm
Carnival PLC Leisure No M&A activities in the defined sample period 
Cocacola HBC AG (Coca-Cola Hellenic Bottling 
Company SA)
Food & Beverages No market capitalization reported on Thomson Reuters Eikon
Compass Group PLC Food & Beverage Retailing No valid M&As in defined sample period according to specified 
CRH PLC Construction Materials Only market data of Irish Stock Exchange (ISE) available
Fresnillo PLC No M&A activities in the defined sample period 
Glencore Xstrata PLC Metals & Mining No valid M&As in defined sample period according to specified 
criteria (no majority stake)
Hammerson PLC Property Propery Development and Investment Firm
Hargreaves Lansdown PLC Finance Financial Institution
HSBC Holdings PLC Banking Financial Institution
InterContinental Hotels Group SA Travel, Lodging & Dining No M&A activities in the defined sample period 
International Consolidated Airlines Group SA Transportation & Infrastructure No market capitalization reported on Thomson Reuters Eikon 
(Company listed in 2011)
Kingfisher PLC Home Improvement Retailing No valid M&As in defined sample period according to specified 
criteria (no disclosed deal value)
Land Securities Group PLC Property Propery Development and Investment Firm
Legal & General Group PLC Insurance Financial Institution
Lloyds Banking Group PLC Banking Financial Institution
London Stock Exchange Group Finance Financial Institution
New Melrose Investment fund Financial Institution
Next PLC Advertising & Marketing No valid M&As in defined sample period according to specified 
criteria (no large enough deal values)
Old Mutual PLC Insurance Financial Institution
Prudential PLC Finance Financial Institution
Resolution Ltd. Investment Financial Institution
Rolls-Royce Holdings PLC Machinery No valid M&As in defined sample period according to specified 
criteria (no large enough deal values)
Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC Banking Financial Institution
Royal Dutch Shell PLC Oil &Gas Only market data of Euronext available
Royal Mail Postal services, courier No M&A activities in the defined sample period 
RSA Insurance Group PLC Insurance Financial Institution
Schroders PLC Fund Management Financial Institution
Severn Trent PLC Utilities No M&A activities reported on Thomson Reuters Eikon
Smiths Group PLC Machinery No M&A activities reported on Thomson Reuters Eikon
SSE PLC Utilities No M&A activities reported on Thomson Reuters Eikon
St. James's Place PLC Wealth management Financial Institution
Standard Chartered PLC Banking Financial Institution
Standard Life PLC Fund Management Financial Institution
Tesco PLC Food & Beverage Retailing No valid M&As in defined sample period according to specified 
criteria (no large enough deal values)
TUI Travel PLC Travel Services No valid M&As in defined sample period according to specified 
criteria (no large enough deal values)
United Utilities Group PLC Utilities No M&A activities reported on Thomson Reuters Eikon
WM Morrison Supermarkets PLC Food & Beverage Retailing No valid M&As in defined sample period according to specified 
criteria (no large enough deal values); no market data available
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BG Group PLC Oil Gas 09.02.09 Merger Pure Energy Resource Ltd Oil & Gas            479   
Subsidiary 'BG International (AUS) Pty Ltd.' of 
acquiring company 'BG Group plc acquired the target 
firm.
BG Group PLC Oil Gas 28.10.08 Merger Queensland Gas Co Ltd Oil & Gas         1,770   
Subsidiary 'BG International (AUS) Pty Ltd.' of 
acquiring company 'BG Group plc acquired the target 
firm.
British American  Tobacco PLC Tobacco 28.02.08 Merger House of Prince A/S Tobacco         1,961   Two acquisitions announcements within a short-time period (less than one week inbetween)
British American  Tobacco PLC Tobacco 22.02.08 Acquisition of Assets
Tutun Tutun Mamulleri 
tuz ve Alkol Isletmeleri 
AS
Tobacco            874   
Two acquisitions announcements within a short-time 
period (less than one week inbetween)
Capita PLC Professional Services 23.12.10 Acquisition of Assets SunGard Public Sector Ltd Professional Services              86   
Two acquisitions announcements on the same day 
resulting in an overlapping event window (-1, +1)
Capita PLC Professional Services 23.12.10 Acquisition of Assets BSI Holdings Ltd Travel Services              43   Two acquisitions announcements on the same day resulting in an overlapping event window (-1, +1)
G4S PLC Professional Services 23.11.09 Acquisition of Assets Champions of the West Inc Professional Services              36   
Two acquisitions announcements within a short-time 
period (less than one week inbetween)
G4S PLC Professional Services 17.11.09 Acquisition of Assets Adesta LLC, Adesta LP IT Consulting & Services              39   
Two acquisitions announcements within a short-time 
period (less than one week inbetween)
IMI PLC Machinery 17.02.12 Acquisition of Assets
Interativa Industria 
Comercio e 
Representacoes Ltda
Other Industrial              43   
Two acquisitions announcements on the same day 
resulting in an overlapping event window (-1, +1)
IMI PLC Machinery 16.02.12 Acquisition of Assets Remosa SpA Other Industrial              83   Two acquisitions announcements on the same day resulting in an overlapping event window (-1, +1)
19.11.05 Acquisition of Assets GT Development Corp. Machinery              16   No stock return data for IMI plc and FTSE All-Share index available for the 19.11.05
Meggitt PLC Aerospace & Defense 14.11.04 Acquisition of Assets Wilcoxon Research Inc. Other Industrials                9   No stock return data for Meggitt and FTSE All-Share index available for the 14.11.04
Rexam PLC Containers & Packaging 30.01.06 Merger
Egyptian Can making Co 
(Enaco)
Containers & 
Packaging              60   
Two acquisitions announcements within a short-time 
period (less than one week inbetween)
Rexam PLC Containers & Packaging 25.01.06 Acquisition of Assets Fang Xin Ltd
Containers & 
Packaging              41   
Two acquisitions announcements within a short-time 
period (less than one week inbetween)
SAB Miller PLC Consumer Products 09.10.07 Merger
Molson Coors Brewing 
Co- US & Puerto Rican 
Operations
Food & Beverage         1,275   
SABMiller PLC merged ist US & Puerto Rican 
operations with the US operations of Molson Coors 
Brewing Co to form a Joint Venture
Vodafone Group PLC Wireless 11.02.2007 Acquisitions of majority assets Hutchison Essar Ltd.
Telecommunications 
Services         6,537   
No stock return data for Vodafone Group plc and FTSE 
All-Share index available for the 11.02.2007
Weir Group PLC Machinery 15.08.2005 Merger Pompe Gabbioneta SpA Machinery              68   
No fiscal year end data of 2004 (year prior the 
acquisition announcement) available
Whitbread PLC Food & Beverage Retailing 23.07.2004 Acquisition of assets Premier Lodge Hotels Hotels & Lodging            508   
Two acquisitions announcements on the same day 
resulting in an overlapping event window (-1, +1)
Whitbread PLC Food & Beverage Retailing 23.07.2004 Acquisition of assets
Spirit Group Ltd. Pubs. 
(UK)
Food & Beverage 
Retailing              32   
Two acquisitions announcements on the same day 
resulting in an overlapping event window (-1, +1)
WM Morrison Supermarkets PLC Food & Beverage Retailing 22.10.2005
Acqusisitions of 
Assets Encon Insulation Ltd Building/ Construction            141   
No stock return data for WM Morrison Supermarkets 
plc and FTSE All-Share index available for the 
22.10.2005
WPP PLC Advertising & Marketing 04.05.2008 Merger
Taylor Nelson Sofres. 
PLC Professional Services         1,442   
No stock return data for WPP plc and FTSE All-Share 
index available for the 04.05.08
Appendix C: Excluded M&A deals
Company
Acquisition 
Announcement 
date
CEO Age at 
M&A
CEO since CEO tenure 
(until M&A)
Firm since Firm tenure    
(until M&A)
 CEO 
experience
Other board 
memberships
Education Sources
Aggreko PLC 26.03.12 Rupert C. Soames 52 July 2003 9 July 2003 9 no yes unknown Annual report 2010, 2008, 2006; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
26.09.06 Rupert C. Soames 46 July 2003 3 July 2003 3 no no unknown Annual report 2010, 2008, 2006; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Anglo American PLC 17.01.08 Cynthia Carroll 51 March 2007 1 January 2007 1 yes yes both Annual report 2008; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
ARM Holdings PLC 23.08.04 D. Warren East 42 October 2001 3 January 2004 10 no no both Annual report 2004; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Ashtead Group PLC 13.05.13 Geoffrey Drabble 53 January 2007 6 01.04.05 8 no no business Annual report 2008, 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Associated Britisch Foods 
PLC
19.05.06 George Garfield Weston 41 April 2005 1 1988 18 yes no business Annual  2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
11.07.05 George Garfield Weston 40 April 2005 0 1988 17 yes no business Annual  2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
22.07.04 Peter J. Jackson 57 June 1999 5 1992 12 yes yes business
AstraZeneca PLC 10.06.13 Pascal Soriot 53 October 2012 1 October 2012 1 yes no both Annual  2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
23.04.12 David R.Brennan 58 January 2006 6 1999 37 no yes business Annual report 2011, 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
23.04.07 David R. Brennan 54 January 2006 1 1999 32 no yes business Annual report 2011, 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
15.02.10 Peter L. Rogers 61 August 2003 7 June 2002 8 yes yes business Annual report 2012, 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
18.09.09 Peter L. Rogers 61 August 2003 6 June 2002 7 yes yes business Annual report 2012, 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
21.04.08 Peter L. Rogers 60 August 2003 5 June 2002 6 yes yes business Annual report 2012, 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
10.05.07 Peter L. Rogers 59 August 2003 4 June 2002 5 yes yes business Annual report 2012, 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
04.04.07 Peter L. Rogers 59 August 2003 4 June 2002 5 yes yes business Annual report 2012, 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
13.06.06 Peter L. Rogers 58 August 2003 3 June 2002 4 yes yes business Annual report 2012, 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
09.05.06 Peter L. Rogers 58 August 2003 3 June 2002 4 yes yes business Annual report 2012, 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
10.09.04 Peter L. Rogers 56 August 2003 1 June 2002 2 yes yes business Annual report 2012, 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
19.03.04 Peter L. Rogers 55 August 2003 1 June 2002 2 yes yes business Annual report 2012, 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
BAE Systems PLC 22.12.10 Ian King 53 September 2008 2 2001 9 yes yes unknown Annual report 2010, 2008; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
18.05.10 Ian King 53 September 2008 2 2001 9 yes yes unknown Annual report 2010, 2008; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
03.06.04 Mike Turner 56 2002 2 1999 5 no yes technical Annual report 2003; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
BG Group PLC 28.12.06 Francis Chapman 52 October 2000 6 November 1996 10 no yes technical Annual report 2006; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
16.02.04 Francis Chapman 50 October 2000 4 November 1996 8 no yes technical Annual report 2006; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
BHP Billiton PLC 14.07.11 Marius J. Kloppers 49 October 2007 4 1993 18 no no both Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
BP PLC 11.03.10 Anthony B. Hayward 52 May 2007 3 1982 28 no yes technical Annual report 2009; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
17.06.09 Paul Adams 55 January 2004 5 July 1991 18 no no business
01.03.13 Jeremy Darroch 50 December 2007 6 August 2004 9 no yes business Annual report 2012, 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
04.06.10 Jeremy Darroch 47 December 2007 3 01.08.04 6 no yes business Annual report 2012, 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
BT Group PLC 08.11.04 Bernardus J. W. Verwaayen 52 February 2002 2 January 2002 2 yes no other Annual report 2004; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Bunzl PLC 10.05.04 Anthony John Habgood 57 1991 13 January 1991 13 yes yes business Annual report 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Burberry Group PLC 16.07.10 Angela Ahrendts 50 July 2006 4 January 2006 4 no no business
Capita PLC 23.10.13 Paul R. M. Pindar 53 1999 14 1987 26 no yes business Annual report 2008, 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
14.02.13 Paul R. M. Pindar 53 1999 14 1987 26 no yes business Annual report 2008, 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
23.12.11 Paul R. M. Pindar 51 1999 12 1987 24 no yes business Annual report 2008, 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
01.07.11 Paul R. M. Pindar 51 1999 12 1987 24 no yes business Annual report 2008, 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
01.06.10 Paul R. M. Pindar 50 1999 11 1987 23 no yes business Annual report 2008, 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
21.12.09 Paul R. M. Pindar 49 1999 10 1987 22 no yes business Annual report 2008, 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
05.06.08 Paul R. M. Pindar 48 1999 9 1987 21 no yes business Annual report 2008, 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Centrica PLC 21.11.11 Samuel Laidlaw 55 July 2006 5 July 2006 5 yes yes business Annual report 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
17.09.07 Samuel Laidlaw 51 July 2006 1 July 2006 1 yes yes business Annual report 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
01.07.05 Roy A. Gardner 59 1997 8 1997 8 no yes business Annual report 2005; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
08.06.04 Roy A. Gardner 58 1997 7 1997 7 no yes business Annual report 2005; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Diageo 21.02.11 Paul Steven Walsh 56 September 2000 11 1997 14 yes yes business
easyJet plc 25.10.07 Andrew Harrison 50 December 2005 2 November 2005 2 yes yes business Annual report 2008; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Experian PLC 06.11.13 Donald Robert 53 February 2005 8 2001 12 yes yes business Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
28.06.11 Donald Robert 51 February 2005 6 2001 10 yes yes business Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
03.05.11 Donald Robert 51 February 2005 6 2001 10 yes yes business Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
21.09.10 Donald Robert 50 February 2005 5 2001 9 yes yes business Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
10.12.08 Donald Robert 48 February 2005 3 2001 7 yes yes business Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
G4S PLC 04.06.08 Nick Buckles 47 July 2005 3 2004 4 yes yes business
18.12.07 Nick Buckles 46 July 2005 2 2004 3 yes yes business
GKN PLC 05.07.12 Nigel Stein 56 January 2012 0 1994 18 no yes technical Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
28.07.11 Kevin Smith 56 January 2003 8 1999 12 no yes business
18.07.11 Kevin Smith 56 January 2003 8 1999 12 no yes business
15.09.08 Kevin Smith 53 January 2003 5 1999 9 no yes business
03.08.06 Kevin Smith 51 January 2003 3 1999 7 no yes business
04.08.04 Kevin Smith 49 January 2003 1 1999 5 no yes business
GlaxoSmithKline PLC 19.04.12 Andrew Philip Witty 47 May 2008 4 2000 11 no yes business
Annual report 2004; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://archive.today/v3iKF (accessed: 03/05/2014)
Annual report 2008, 2009; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/paul-
adams-addicted-to-innovation-addicted-to-growth--but-not-
addicted-to-fags-404415.html (accessed: 03/05/2014)
Annual report 2012, Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandc
onsumer/10379243/Angela-Ahrendts-Profile.html (accessed: 
04/05/2014)
Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.thecompleteuniversityguide.co.uk/manchester-
metropolitan (accessed: 04/05/2014)
Annual report 2008; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/nick-
buckles-the-security-supremo-at-large-466268.html 
(accessed: 27/04/2014)
Babcock International 
Group PLC
British American  
Tobacco PLC
British Sky Broadcasting 
Group PLC
Annual report 2008; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/nick-
buckles-the-security-supremo-at-large-466268.html 
(accessed: 27/04/2014)
Annual report 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AMDA-
IQL9S/0x0xS1047469-13-4709/1544175/filing.pdf 
(accessed: 27/04/2014)
Annual report 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AMDA-
IQL9S/0x0xS1047469-13-4709/1544175/filing.pdf 
(accessed: 27/04/2014)
Annual report 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AMDA-
IQL9S/0x0xS1047469-13-4709/1544175/filing.pdf 
(accessed: 27/04/2014)
Annual report 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AMDA-
IQL9S/0x0xS1047469-13-4709/1544175/filing.pdf 
(accessed: 27/04/2014)
Annual report 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/AMDA-
IQL9S/0x0xS1047469-13-4709/1544175/filing.pdf 
(accessed: 27/04/2014)
Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek, 
http://www.gsk.com/about-us/our-history.html (accessed: 
27/04/2014)
Appendix D: CEO characteristics
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GlaxoSmithKline PLC 20.04.09 Andrew Philip Witty 44 May 2008 1 2000 8 no yes business
21.11.07 Jean-Pierre Garnier 59 May 2000 7 2000 7 yes yes both
07.09.05 Jean-Pierre Garnier 57 May 2000 5 2000 5 yes yes both
IMI PLC 22.08.13 Martin Lamb 53 January 2001 12 1986 27 no yes both Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
25.10.10 Martin Lamb 50 January 2001 9 1986 24 no yes both Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
06.03.06 Martin Lamb 46 January 2001 5 1986 20 no yes both Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
03.10.05 Martin Lamb 45 January 2001 4 1986 19 no yes both Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
09.02.05 Martin Lamb 45 January 2001 4 1986 19 no yes both Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
08.02.07 Gareth Davis 56 March 1996 11 1972 35 no yes business Annual report 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
30.08.06 Gareth Davis 55 March 1996 10 1972 34 no yes business Annual report 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Intertek Group PLC 19.11.13 Wolfhart Hauser 63 March 2005 8 November 2002 11 yes yes both Annual report 2012, 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
07.03.11 Wolfhart Hauser 61 March 2005 6 November 2002 9 yes yes both Annual report 2012, 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
30.09.08 Wolfhart Hauser 58 March 2005 3 November 2002 6 yes yes both Annual report 2012, 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
09.04.08 Wolfhart Hauser 58 March 2005 3 November 2002 6 yes yes both Annual report 2012, 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
10.05.04 Richard C Nelson 61 1996 8 1996 8 yes no business Annual report 2008, 2004; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
itv plc 06.12.05 Charles L. Allen 48 2004 1 2001 4 yes yes business
27.04.05 Charles L. Allen 48 2004 1 2001 4 yes yes business
J Sainsbury PLC 04.03.09 Justin King 46 March 2004 5 March 2004 5 no yes business Annual report 2008; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Johnson Matthey PLC 28.03.13 Neil Carson 55 August 2004 9 1980 33 no yes technical Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
23.10.12 Neil Carson 55 August 2004 8 1980 32 no yes technical Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
06.10.10 Neil Carson 52 August 2004 6 1980 30 no yes technical Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
10.12.07 Neil Carson 49 August 2004 3 1980 27 no yes technical Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
01.02.06 Neil Carson 49 August 2004 2 1980 26 no yes technical Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
31.03.04 Chris Clark 61 June 1998 6 1962 42 no yes technical Annual report 2003; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
12.07.04 Stuart Rose 55 May 2004 0 May 2004 0 yes yes business
Meggitt PLC 18.01.11 Terry Twigger 61 January 2001 10 1993 18 no yes business Annual report 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
06.03.07 Terry Twigger 57 January 2001 6 1993 14 no yes business Annual report 2006; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
13.09.06 Terry Twigger 56 January 2001 5 1993 13 no yes business Annual report 2006; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
05.07.04 Terry Twigger 54 January 2001 3 1993 11 no yes business Annual report 2006; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Mondi PLC 14.09.12 David Hathorn 49 2000 12 1991 21 no yes business Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
National Grid PLC 27.02.06 Roger Urwin 59 April 2001 5 November 1995 11 yes yes technical Annual report 2005, 2004; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
25.06.04 Roger Urwin 58 April 2001 3 November 1995 9 yes yes technical Annual report 2005, 2004; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Pearson PLC 16.10.12 Marjorie Scardino 65 January 1997 15 January 1997 15 yes yes other
21.11.11 Marjorie Scardino 64 January 1997 14 January 1997 14 yes yes other
26.04.11 Marjorie Scardino 64 January 1997 14 January 1997 14 yes yes other
07.03.11 Marjorie Scardino 64 January 1997 14 January 1997 14 yes yes other
Pearson PLC 22.07.10 Marjorie Scardino 63 January 1997 13 January 1997 13 yes yes other
19.05.10 Marjorie Scardino 63 January 1997 13 January 1997 13 yes yes other
15.04.09 Marjorie Scardino 62 January 1997 12 January 1997 12 yes yes other
04.05.07 Marjorie Scardino 60 January 1997 10 January 1997 10 yes yes other
08.08.06 Marjorie Scardino 59 January 1997 9 January 1997 9 yes yes other
Persimmon PLC 08.10.12 Mike Farley 58 April 2006 6 1983 29 no no technical
14.12.05 John White 53 1993 12 1979 26 no no other
14.11.05 John White 53 1993 12 1979 26 no no other
Petrofac Ltd. 29.08.08 Ayman Asfari 49 January 2002 6 1991 17 no no technical
25.07.08 Ayman Asfari 49 January 2002 6 1991 17 no no technical
Randgold Resources Ltd. 16.07.09 Dennis Mark Bristow 50 October 1995 14 1995 14 yes yes technical
15.11.12 Rakesh Kapoor 53 September 2011 1 1987 25 no no both Annual report 2013, 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
13.12.10 Bart Becht 53 December 1999 11 1988 22 yes yes business Annual report 2009; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
21.07.10 Bart Becht 53 December 1999 11 1988 22 yes yes business Annual report 2009; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
10.12.07 Bart Becht 50 December 1999 8 1988 19 yes yes business Annual report 2009; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
07.10.05 Bart Becht 48 December 1999 6 1988 17 yes yes business Annual report 2009; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Reed Elsevier PLC 26.09.11 Erik Engstrom 47 March 2009 2 2004 7 yes yes both
21.02.08 Crispin Davis 58 September 1999 9 September 1999 9 yes yes business Annual report 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
26.05.05 Crispin Davis 55 September 1999 4 September 1999 4 yes yes business Annual report 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Annual report 2010; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.forbes.com/profile/erik-engstrom/ (accessed: 
02/05/2014)
Annual report 2013; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/may/06/mark-
bristow-randgold-interview (accessed: 27/04/2014)
Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.building.co.uk/braving-the-cold-mike-farley-on-
coaxing-persimmon-back-to-health/3153866.article 
(accessed: 27/04/2014)
Annual report 2004; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; ; 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/apr/21/john-
white-persimmon-homes-friday-interview (accessed: 
27/04/2014)
Annual report 2004; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; ; 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/apr/21/john-
white-persimmon-homes-friday-interview (accessed: 
27/04/2014)
Annual report 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d86c037e-95b7-11e0-8f82-
00144feab49a.html#axzz2xieuEozn (27.04.2014)
Annual report 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d86c037e-95b7-11e0-8f82-
00144feab49a.html#axzz2xieuEozn (27.04.2014)
Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/03/us-pearson-ceo-
idUSBRE89207O20121003 (accessed: 17/04/2014)
Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/03/us-pearson-ceo-
idUSBRE89207O20121003 (accessed: 17/04/2014)
Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/03/us-pearson-ceo-
idUSBRE89207O20121003 (accessed: 17/04/2014)
Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/03/us-pearson-ceo-
idUSBRE89207O20121003 (accessed: 17/04/2014)
Annual report 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek, 
http://www.gsk.com/about-us/our-history.html (accessed: 
27/04/2014)
Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/03/us-pearson-ceo-
idUSBRE89207O20121003 (accessed: 17/04/2014)
Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek, 
http://www.gsk.com/about-us/our-history.html (accessed: 
27/04/2014)
Annual report 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek, 
http://www.gsk.com/about-us/our-history.html (accessed: 
27/04/2014)
Bloomberg BusinessWeek; Annual report Tesco 2009 
(http://www.tescoplc.com/files/pdf/reports/Annual_report_2
009.pdf; accessed: 27/04/2014)
Bloomberg BusinessWeek; Annual report Tesco 2009 
(http://www.tescoplc.com/files/pdf/reports/Annual_report_2
009.pdf; accessed: 27/04/2014)
Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/03/us-pearson-ceo-
idUSBRE89207O20121003 (accessed: 17/04/2014)
Annual report 2006, 2005; Bloomberg 
BusinessWeek;http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/334452cc-
d93d-11e2-a6cf-00144feab7de.html#axzz30dcIaUXN 
(accessed: 03/05/2014); 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandc
onsumer/5427513/Sir-Stuart-Rose-after-a-year-of-turbulence-
the-MandS-boss-expects-a-happy-landing.html (accessed 
03/05/2014)
Imperial Tobacco Group 
PLC
Marks and Spencer 
Group PLC
Reckitt Benckiser Group 
PLC
Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/03/us-pearson-ceo-
idUSBRE89207O20121003 (accessed: 17/04/2014)
Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/03/us-pearson-ceo-
idUSBRE89207O20121003 (accessed: 17/04/2014)
Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/03/us-pearson-ceo-
idUSBRE89207O20121003 (accessed: 17/04/2014)
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Rexam PLC 04.07.07 Leslie van de Walle 50 February 2007 0 January 2007 0 yes yes business Annual report 2006; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
08.06.07 Leslie van de Walle 50 February 2007 0 January 2007 0 yes yes business Annual report 2006; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
14.11.05 Lars Emilson 63 October 2004 1 2000 5 yes no business Annual report 2004; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
06.09.05 Lars Emilson 63 October 2004 1 2000 5 yes no business Annual report 2004; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Rio Tinto PLC 06.12.10 Tom Albanese 52 May 2007 3 1993 17 no yes both Annual report 2009; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
SAB Miller PLC 19.11.07 Graham Mackay 57 1999 8 1978 29 no yes both
19.07.05 Graham Mackay 55 1999 6 1978 27 no yes both
Shire PLC 08.01.13 Angus Russell 57 June 2008 5 December 1999 14 no yes business Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
15.03.12 Angus Russell 56 June 2008 4 December 1999 13 no yes business Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
17.05.11 Angus Russell 55 June 2008 3 December 1999 12 no yes business Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
30.06.10 Angus Russell 54 June 2008 2 December 1999 11 no yes business Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
20.02.07 Mattew Emmens 55 March 2003 4 March 2003 4 yes yes business Annual report 2006; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
21.04.05 Mattew Emmens 53 March 2003 2 March 2003 2 yes yes business Annual report 2006; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Smith & Nephew PLC 28.11.12 Olivier Bohuon 53 April 2011 1 April 2011 1 yes yes both Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
12.03.07 Christopher O'Donnell 60 July 1997 10 1988 19 no yes technical Annual report 2006; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
07.08.09 David Forsey 43 May 2001 8 1984 25 no yes unknown
The Sage Group PLC 09.01.06 Paul Walker 48 1994 12 1984 22 no yes business Annual report 2006; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Travis Perkins PLC 28.05.10 Geoff Cooper 55 March 2005 5 February 2005 5 no yes business Annual report 2009; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
07.04.08 Geoff Cooper 53 March 2005 3 February 2005 3 no yes business Annual report 2009; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
16.12.04 Frank MacKay 58 January 2000 4 November 1999 5 no yes unknown Annual report 2003; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Tullow Oil PLC 11.12.12 Aidan Heavey 58 1985 27 1985 27 no yes business Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
24.05.11 Aidan Heavey 57 1985 26 1985 26 no yes business Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
25.09.06 Aidan Heavey 52 1985 21 1985 21 no yes business Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
20.12.04 Aidan Heavey 50 1985 19 1985 19 no yes business Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
26.03.04 Aidan Heavey 50 1985 19 1985 19 no yes business Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Unilever PLC 27.09.10 Paul Polman 53 January 2009 1 November 2008 2 no yes business Annual report 2009; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
25.09.09 Paul Polman 52 January 2009 0 November 2008 1 no yes business Annual report 2009; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Vodafone Group PLC 09.02.09 Vittorio Colao 46 July 2008 1 1996 13 yes yes business Annual report 2008; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
13.12.05 Arun Sarin 50 July 2003 2 June 1999 6 yes yes technical Annual report 2004; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
04.11.05 Arun Sarin 50 July 2003 2 June 1999 6 yes yes technical Annual report 2004; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
15.03.05 Arun Sarin 49 July 2003 2 June 1999 6 yes yes technical Annual report 2004; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Weir Group PLC 25.01.12 Keith Cochrane 47 September 2009 3 July 2006 6 yes yes business Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
23.11.11 Keith Cochrane 46 September 2009 2 July 2006 5 yes yes business Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
14.06.10 Keith Cochrane 45 September 2009 1 July 2006 4 yes yes business Annual report 2011; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
24.06.08 Mark Selway 48 June 2001 7 June 2001 7 no yes technical Annual report 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
04.12.07 Mark Selway 47 June 2001 6 June 2001 6 no yes technical Annual report 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
21.06.07 Mark Selway 47 June 2001 6 June 2001 6 no yes technical Annual report 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Whitbread PLC 11.12.09 Alan Parker 62 June 2004 5 1992 17 no yes business Annual report 2009, 2008; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
26.09.07 Alan Parker 60 June 2004 3 1992 15 no yes business Annual report 2009, 2008; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
William Hill PLC 20.03.13 Ralph Topping 60 Feburary 2008 5 1973 40 no yes unknown
14.04.11 Ralph Topping 58 Feburary 2008 3 1973 38 no yes unknown
16.05.05 David Harding 49 2000 5 2000 5 no no business
Wolseley PLC 02.10.06 Chip Hornsby 50 August 2006 0 1982 24 no yes business
24.07.06 Charles A. Banks 64 May 2001 5 1982 24 no yes business
31.10.05 Charles A. Banks 64 May 2001 4 1982 23 no yes business
30.07.04 Charles A. Banks 62 May 2001 3 1982 22 no yes business
WPP PLC 29.09.08 Martin Sorrell 63 1986 22 1986 22 no yes business Annual report 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
17.05.07 Martin Sorrell 62 1986 21 1986 21 no yes business Annual report 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
13.09.04 Martin Sorrell 59 1986 18 1986 18 no yes business Annual report 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek
Annual report 2005; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.ferguson.com/corporate/about-us (accessed: 
26/04/2014)
Annual report 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.sabmiller.com/index.asp?pageid=356 (accessed: 
21.04.2014)
Annual report 2009; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.sportsdirectplc.com/about-us/leadership.aspx 
(accessed: 27.04.2014)
Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-
features/the-business-onralph-topping-chief-executive-
william-hill-2226114.html (accessed: 26/04/2014)
Annual report 2012; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-
features/the-business-onralph-topping-chief-executive-
william-hill-2226114.html (accessed: 26/04/2014)
Annual report 2004; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.williamhillplc.com/media/press-
releases/2007pr/2007-06-25.aspx (accessed: 03/05/2014); 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/migrationtemp/2807324/
Business-profile-William-Hills-thoroughbred.html 
(accessed: 03/05/2014)
Annual report 2007; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.sabmiller.com/index.asp?pageid=356 (accessed: 
21.04.2014)
Annual report 2006; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.wolseley.com/index.asp?pageid=69&newsid=27 
(accessed: 03/05/2014)
Annual report 2005; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.ferguson.com/corporate/about-us (accessed: 
26/04/2014)
Annual report 2005; Bloomberg BusinessWeek; 
http://www.ferguson.com/corporate/about-us (accessed: 
26/04/2014)
Bloomberg Business Week; Available online: 
http://www.businessweek.com
Sports Direct 
International PLC
Appendix E: Descriptive statistics for control variables
I. Absolute values
DEALSIZE ASSETS MARKETCAP OPCF CAPEX Q ROA SOLVENCY OPINC
 Mean
 656.9350  11657.17  12598.49  1329.395 -6.669.124  1.649599  0.076890  0.386975  1180.593
 Median
 193.3516  3830.000  4840.900  390.0000 -9.850.000  1.400075  0.069500  0.353000  369.4000
 Maximum
 9635.228  147197.0  114873.6  18729.30 -2.500.000  7.291927  0.211000  1.202000  20189.40
 Minimum
 4.363600  219.4000  150.3000 -2.100.000 -33354.00  0.428297 -0.020000  0.000000 -5.070.000
 Std. Dev.
 1322.915  25582.72  21308.84  2751.738  2922.273  0.936818  0.039177  0.201411  2535.684
 Skewness
 4.254745  4.308116  2.882360  3.935141 -9.351.770  1.966326  0.642921  0.855603  4.029708
 Kurtosis
 23.74276  22.09942  10.95687  20.60440  100.5795  10.31998  3.546087  4.540158  25.33288
 Jarque-Bera
 3434.935  3000.020  659.7163  2541.018  66221.79  466.0731  13.33595  35.33541  3852.030
 Probability
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.001271  0.000000  0.000000
 Observations
 164  164  164  164  161  162  164  160  164
II. Log-values
LN_DEALSIZE LN_ASSETS LN_MARKETCAP LN_OPCF -LN_CAPEX Q ROA SOLVENCY LN_OPINC
 Mean
 5.377870  8.325393  8.570767  5.950980 -4.800.764  1.649599  0.076890  0.386975  5.889559
 Median
 5.263935  8.250620  8.484837  5.966147 -4.590.057  1.400075  0.069500  0.353000  5.911871
 Maximum
 9.173181  11.89953  11.65159  9.837844 -0.916291  7.291927  0.211000  1.202000  9.912913
 Minimum
 1.473297  5.390897  5.012633 -3.044.522 -1.041.493  0.428297 -0.020000  0.000000 -8.531.096
 Std. Dev.
 1.509884  1.354502  1.285974  1.817862  1.611727  0.936818  0.039177  0.201411  1.964909
 Skewness
 0.116374  0.393114  0.233538 -1.316.630 -0.422607  1.966326  0.642921  0.855603 -2.779.863
 Kurtosis
 2.627818  3.130290  3.193859  8.252287  3.936738  10.31998  3.546087  4.540158  20.75048
 Jarque-Bera
 1.316724  4.340057  1.747568  235.8907  10.67876  466.0731  13.33595  35.33541  2364.264
 Probability
 0.517699  0.114174  0.417369  0.000000  0.004799  0.000000  0.001271  0.000000  0.000000
 Observations
 164  164  164  164  161  162  164  160  164
Appendix F: Correlation matrix
AGE CEOTENURE FIRMTENURE BOARD-OUTSIDE EXPERIENCE EDUCATIONBT
BUSINESS-
ONLY
TECHNICAL-
ONLY THREEORMORE
AGE 1.000000  0.299178  0.114636  0.116401  0.118231 -0.016224 -0.079464 -0.099271  0.306650
CEOTENURE
 0.299178 1.000000  0.437774  0.134134 -0.206999 -0.108206  0.018678 -0.093464  0.412400
FIRMTENURE
 0.114636  0.437774 1.000000  0.022523 -0.520969  0.017942 -0.157672  0.145966  0.142521
BOARDOUTSIDE
 0.116401  0.134134  0.022523 1.000000  0.044120 -0.043609  0.097982 -0.007153  0.238645
EXPERIENCE
 0.118231 -0.206999 -0.520969  0.044120 1.000000  0.034261 -0.001471 -0.151420  0.080773
EDUCATIONBT -0.016224 -0.108206  0.017942 -0.043609  0.034261 1.000000 -0.454756 -0.155329 -0.026190
BUSINESSONLY -0.079464  0.018678 -0.157672  0.097982 -0.001471 -0.454756 1.000000 -0.520480  0.045725
TECHNICALONLY -0.099271 -0.093464  0.145966 -0.007153 -0.151420 -0.155329 -0.520480 1.000000 -0.080633
THREEORMORE
 0.306650  0.412400  0.142521  0.238645  0.080773 -0.026190  0.045725 -0.080633 1.000000
FIRSTDEAL -0.242164 -0.312685 -0.117515 -0.249146 -0.045777  0.054386 -0.063850  0.075249 -0.589314
LN_DEALSIZE -0.012225  0.010777  0.002723  0.056443  0.081218  0.071531 -0.001482  0.008238 -0.100945
LN_ASSETS
 0.029262 -0.109407  0.008308  0.051788  0.107751  0.048439 -0.123734  0.078515 -0.102209
LN_MARKETCAP -0.033753 -0.050484  0.076083  0.024011  0.063550  0.159977 -0.127086  0.065525 -0.078443
LN_OPCF -0.031507 -0.077976  0.065271  0.062215  0.086822  0.125730 -0.154355  0.069135 -0.132975
LN_CAPEX -0.146899 -0.154443 -0.021369  0.025432 -0.052461  0.158314 -0.160063  0.164914 -0.238220
Q -0.072428  0.202466  0.131727 -0.034576 -0.096929  0.222520  0.019117 -0.039071  0.049185
ROA -0.099192 -0.041107  0.156480 -0.257630 -0.164965  0.334995 -0.026590 -0.173838 -0.144821
SOLVENCY
 0.095895 -0.025664 -0.121401 -0.006793  0.018599 -0.080386  0.274789 -0.239345 -0.034522
LN_OPINC  0.039520 -0.055554  0.104605 -0.045680 -0.038181  0.148413 -0.020537 -0.131191 -0.075689
FIRSTDEAL LN_DEALSIZE LN_ASSETS LN_MARKETCAP LN_OPCF LN_CAPEX Q ROA SOLVENCY LN_OPINC
AGE -0.242164 -0.012225  0.029262 -0.033753 -0.031507 -0.146899 -0.072428 -0.099192  0.095895  0.039520
CEOTENURE -0.312685  0.010777 -0.109407 -0.050484 -0.077976 -0.154443  0.202466 -0.041107 -0.025664 -0.055554
FIRMTENURE -0.117515  0.002723  0.008308  0.076083  0.065271 -0.021369  0.131727  0.156480 -0.121401  0.104605
BOARDOUTSIDE -0.249146  0.056443  0.051788  0.024011  0.062215  0.025432 -0.034576 -0.257630 -0.006793 -0.045680
EXPERIENCE -0.045777  0.081218  0.107751  0.063550  0.086822 -0.052461 -0.096929 -0.164965  0.018599 -0.038181
EDUCATIONBT
 0.054386  0.071531  0.048439  0.159977  0.125730  0.158314  0.222520  0.334995 -0.080386  0.148413
BUSINESSONLY -0.063850 -0.001482 -0.123734 -0.127086 -0.154355 -0.160063  0.019117 -0.026590  0.274789 -0.020537
TECHNICALONLY
 0.075249  0.008238  0.078515  0.065525  0.069135  0.164914 -0.039071 -0.173838 -0.239345 -0.131191
THREEORMORE -0.589314 -0.100945 -0.102209 -0.078443 -0.132975 -0.238220  0.049185 -0.144821 -0.034522 -0.075689
FIRSTDEAL 1.000000  0.106322  0.050991  0.032177  0.056983  0.166599 -0.038099  0.065728 -0.001569 -0.010323
LN_DEALSIZE
 0.106322 1.000000  0.613483  0.651703  0.623341  0.546069  0.071420  0.152399 -0.145332  0.398046
LN_ASSETS
 0.050991  0.613483 1.000000  0.913011  0.880582  0.817172 -0.238702 -0.100174 -0.064969  0.548130
LN_MARKETCAP
 0.032177  0.651703  0.913011 1.000000  0.889914  0.808917  0.153016  0.200406 -0.090707  0.595079
LN_OPCF
 0.056983  0.623341  0.880582  0.889914 1.000000  0.789309 -0.021521  0.129834 -0.036139  0.555168
LN_CAPEX
 0.166599  0.546069  0.817172  0.808917  0.789309 1.000000 -0.036524  0.051848  0.006182  0.485382
Q -0.038099  0.071420 -0.238702  0.153016 -0.021521 -0.036524 1.000000  0.702888  0.087201  0.079464
ROA
 0.065728  0.152399 -0.100174  0.200406  0.129834  0.051848  0.702888 1.000000  0.131315  0.349181
SOLVENCY -0.001569 -0.145332 -0.064969 -0.090707 -0.036139  0.006182  0.087201  0.131315 1.000000  0.077049
LN_OPINC -0.010323  0.398046  0.548130  0.595079  0.555168  0.485382  0.079464  0.349181  0.077049 1.000000
Appendix G: Test for normality distribution of the residuals 
I. Regression 4 
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Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2/16/2004 11/19/2013
Observations 164
Mean       2.46e-17
Median  -0.001864
Maximum  0.107900
Minimum -0.147508
Std. Dev.   0.036308
Skewness  -0.190502
Kurtosis   4.879888
Jarque-Bera  25.14080
Probability  0.000003
 
 
II. Regression 5, excluding outliers 
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Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2/16/2004 11/19/2013
Observations 159
Mean       4.04e-18
Median  -0.002092
Maximum  0.093276
Minimum -0.096899
Std. Dev.   0.030739
Skewness  -0.011408
Kurtosis   3.621354
Jarque-Bera  2.561238
Probability  0.277865
 
The five excluded CAR3Day observations belong to the acquisitions: 
 ARM Holdings PLC- 23.08.04 
 Babcock International Group PLC- 10.05.07 
 GKN PLC- 05.07.12 
 Shire PLC- 21.04.05 
 Weir Group PLC- 21.06.07 
